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What does it mean to have the right to peaceably assemble?  
Though treated second in recent years in favor of the right to free speech, the 
significance of assembly in American life has never been clearer, or more fraught. In 
2020, a national civil rights movement broke out, inspiring an estimated 15 to 26 million 
people to take to the streets for the Black Lives Matter movement.1 Many of these 
assemblies were then dispersed through brutal means: tear gas, pepper spray, and “less-
lethal” rounds were commonly used across the country to break up protests, while reports 
from Portland detailed a policy that required detainees to relinquish their assembly right 
in their release agreement.2 And the Attorney General set members of the National Guard 
against peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square, so that the President could walk to St. 
John’s Church.3 
It’s difficult to reconcile these two realities. At the same time that protests are 
becoming a key part of political activism in American life, they are also being violently 
repressed.  
All of these events come with an important pretext: The Supreme Court of the 
United States has not decided a case on the grounds of the right to assemble in over 30 
 
1 Buchanan, Bui, and Patel, “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History.” 
2 Gabbatt, Thomas, and Barr, “Nearly 1,000 Instances of Police Brutality Recorded in US Anti-
Racism Protests.” 
3 Allen, “Trump and Tear Gas in Lafayette Square: A Memo from the Protest Front Lines.” 
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years. Rather, freedoms of speech and expressive association have been the mechanism 
by which American's freedom to gather has been defended.4 
What does this absence of a constitutional decision mean? Is something lost by 
the failure to invoke the freedom to assembly, or is something gained by deferring to 
freedom of speech? Is it time for a new approach by the Supreme Court or is the current 
system working? How do we understand a right that is so alive and so restricted at the 
same time? 
Throughout this paper, I will seek to answer these questions. To do so, I will 
begin by examining the history of assembly, from how it was understood when it was 
first written into the Bill of Rights to its eventual collapse into free speech. Then, I will 
consider the history of the nontextual right made independent from assembly in 1958: 
association. Association emerged at the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement as a key 
protection but has been subsumed by freedom of speech in the intervening years. With 
this perspective, I will then compare the several theories posited by different assembly 
and association experts. These theories highlight the important role that assembly plays in 
self-governance and offer a new perspective on how to understand the events of 2020, 
which I will delve into during Chapter V. The chilling-effect the last year has had on 
assembly and timeliness for the Court to reinvigorate this right will be my central 
conclusion.  
The freedom to peaceable assembly is tucked into the second to last clause of the 
First Amendment. The text of the entire Amendment reads:  
 
4 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 7. 
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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances”.5  
The right to peacefully assemble is in good company. It is proceeded by some of the most 
famous and closely-held rights in the United States: freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press, and freedom of religion. It was an extremely valuable right to the Founders, both 
because of the importance assembly had in British life and its importance to self-
governance. Both British statutory and common included the right to assemble.6 
The famous case of the Quaker William Penn kept the right to assemble in the 
forefront of minds throughout England and the new American colonies. Penn and his 
fellow Quakers had gathered to worship in violation of the 1664 Conventicle Act. Unable 
to enter their meeting-house because of soldiers, Penn sermonized on the street and was 
arrested. What proceeded was a sensational trial—heightened by Penn’s insistence on 
wearing a hat in the courtroom—which ended with his acquittal from unlawful assembly. 
It was an event that captured the importance of assembly in the minds of the American 
colonists and would come to be referenced at debates in the First Congress.7 
 In Chapter II, I will begin where this introduction left off: the founding. In 1791, 
the First Congress of the United States the Bill of Rights, amending the Constitution that 
had created their new system of government four years earlier.8 At the time, there was 
 
5 “The Constitution of the United States.” 
6 Brod, “Rethinking a Reinvigorated Right to Assembly.” 
7 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 24. 
8 Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties. 
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exceedingly little debate over the right. It was taken to be so fundamental, so obvious, 
that some representatives felt it was not even worthy of inclusion. Despite these 
disagreements, it was still added.9  
There are several noteworthy features of the text itself, which I will delve into 
further. First, the language of the amendment differs from the language of any other 
assembly right in state constitutions of the time.10 It also differs from the original draft. 
Assembly is not constrained by the common good in the Bill of Rights: people may 
gather for whatever reason they wish, and not only to consult for their or the “common 
good.” Assembly also is not limited by the right to petition, the fifth and final right in the 
First Amendment.11  
 Beyond the text, I'll consider the role that assembly played in everyday life. 
Gatherings, at taverns, in the streets, and elsewhere, were a common part of life in the 
late 1700s and early 1800s. Both political and non-political, neither permission nor 
permits were required for gatherings. Whether these groups be discussion groups, 
political parades, or tavern gatherings they were respected as free assemblies.12 This 
understanding was reflected in the political writing and state court rulings of the time. 
State courts continually defended broad assembly rights: striking down ordinances that 
required permits to gather and respecting the rights of groups to determine their 
 
9 Whipple. 101. 
10 Thorpe and United States., The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other 
Organic Laws of the State, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United 
States of America. 
11 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 22-23. 
12 Abu El-Haj, “The Neglected Right of Assembly.” 555; Linnekin, “Tavern Talk and the Origins of 
the Assembly Clause.”, Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 26. 
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membership.13 In this way, people in the Founding era used their unimpeded assembly 
right as a critical tool in self-governance. 
 In the Antebellum South, a very different story was unfolding. White 
governments passed extreme restrictions on how their Black citizens could assemble. 
These regulations initially targeted religious services but were extended to schools and 
other gathering places. They diluted the religious and political life of Black Americans to 
great and damaging, effect. After the Civil War and passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the first Enforcement Act was passed to protect Black Southerners from 
infringements on their constitutional rights to some success.14 
 The Supreme Court made its first ruling on the right to peaceably assemble in 
1875. The case was US v. Cruikshank. After the Colfax Massacre, in which armed white 
men killed over 100 Black men during a governorship controversy, three white men were 
arrested for violating the constitutional rights of other citizens.15 In this opinion, Justice 
Waite argues that the equal protection of the laws promised in the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not apply to private actors or state governments. Specifically, the right 
to peaceably assembly constrains the actions of the federal government, but not those of 
state or private actors. This decision effectively gutted the Enforcement Act.16 
 The Supreme Court made another ruling at the end of the 19th century which 
legalized permit requirements for assembly. In Davis v. Massachusetts (1897), the Court 
reviewed a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision which held that legislatures were 
 
13 Abu El-Haj, “The Neglected Right of Assembly.” 566. 
14 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 38. 
15 Inazu. 38. 
16 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
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entitled to place whatever restrictions they wished on public land. While the Court later 
changed their treatment of public spaces, the permit requirements in Davis were never 
overruled.17 
 In the 20th century, the right to assembly became more tightly regulated, more 
celebrated, and finally, more neglected. While permit requirements were becoming more 
common across the United States and World War I related legislation was placing new 
restrictions on group memberships, labor, women’s equality, and black rights movements 
were also utilizing assembly to pursue their agendas. 
 Assembly was especially important to the Suffragettes, who won women the right 
to vote with the Nineteenth Amendment. By forming associations that stretched across 
the country and organizing assemblies on streets that won public attention, women used 
the power of assembly to leverage political influence for themselves.18 
 In Whitney v. California (1927), communist organizations and the right to 
assembly came before the Supreme Court for the first, though certainly not the last time, 
time. Ms. Whitney was being prosecuted for her association with a communist 
organization that advocated for violence, though she had never done so herself. Despite 
this, the Court still choose to focus its reasoning primarily on speech rights. This choice 
was both odd and prophetic. Notably, in his concurrence, Justice Brandeis linked speech 
and assembly as coequal rights for the first time. 19 
 The language used by Brandeis in his Whitney concurrence was echoed in the 
Court’s decision in DeJonge v. Oregon (1937). DeJonge brought the Communist Party 
 
17 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 
18 Lumsden, Rampant Women. 
19 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
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and the right to assemble before the Court once more. In ruling that Oregon’s criminal 
syndicalism law violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
freedom to assemble, the Court reversed course from their Whitney decision. Most 
importantly, the right to assemble was applied to states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.20 
 The Court made this ruling at a point when assembly was growing as a popular 
talking point in the United States. As the labor movement grew momentum, support for 
assembly became more politically popular. It worked its way into the rhetoric of political 
figures like President Roosevelt’s interior secretary, Harold Ickes, and former president 
Herbert Hoover. At the New York World Fair in 1939, assembly was part of the four 
fundamental rights at the center of the celebration. And polling found in 1941 that 89.9% 
of Americans felt their personal liberties would be infringed by restrictions on 
assembly—nearly eight points higher than restrictions on speech by press and radio.21 
 The same year as the World Fair, the Court ruled on Hague v CIO (1939). Hague 
is widely seen as establishing the public forum doctrine in the Supreme Court, a 
philosophy that treats public spaces as protected areas for free speech and assembly and 
overturning Davis. Notably, the Court did not take issue with permit requirements in 
Hague.22 This decision captures the push and pulls surrounding assembly at the time. It 
was being expanded to the states, celebrated on the world state, and defended in public 
spaces. But it existed in a manner more restricted than the Founders had anticipated 
because of permit requirements. 
 
20 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
21 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 52, 57. 
22 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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 Assembly began to move out of the spotlight as the 1940s continued. In President 
Roosevelt's State of the Union Address, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of 
religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear were invoked as the “four essential 
human freedoms,” while assembly was absent. The Court then released their decision in 
Cox v. New Hampshire, which confirmed that despite the emergence of the public forum 
doctrine two years prior, regulations were constitutional on assembles in public.23  
Assembly was still an important part of social movements. It was especially 
prominent in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. One of the most famous marches 
stretched from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, in response to voter suppression and 
police brutality against protesters. The case which granted the marchers a permit to use 
the public highway, Williams v Wallace, demonstrates an attempt to reconcile the 
importance of assembly with the prioritization of convenience in public forum doctrine. 
During this time, the Court also continually struck down convictions of protesters but 
avoided ever expanding on the right to assemble.24 
In 1983, the Court released their decision in Perry Education Association v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Association (1983), which diminished assembly to a “communicative 
activity.” This phrasing made assembly entirely subordinate to speech. As a result, no 
case has been decided on the grounds of assembly in the intervening years.25 
 In Chapter III, I will focus on the direction the right to assembly went in the latter 
half of the 20th century: association. The two words were taken to refer to different kinds 
 
23 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 
24 Krotoszynski, “Celebrating Selma.” 
25 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 58, 61. 
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of gatherings: assemblies were more ad hoc, while associations were more permanent. 
However, both fit under the umbrella of association. 
 I begin with an examination of Alexis de Tocqueville’s theory of association in 
the United States. Tocqueville argues that association is uniquely suited to American life. 
His observations are useful for how they both do and do not reflect modern realities.26 
Though it was formalized as an independent right in 1958, the word “association” 
had been used in Supreme Court decisions interchangeably with assembly for the first 
150 years.27 Most prominently, in 1928, the Court ruled in Bryant v. Zimmerman (1928) 
that a New York statute requiring KKK members to register with the state was not a 
violation of any rights.28 Whitney v. California (1927) and Bridges v. Wixon (1945) also 
center on association.29 
 Like in Bryant, membership lists were at the center of NAACP v. Alabama (1958), 
although this time they belonged to the civil rights organization the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) rather than the KKK. The Court ruled 
that the NAACP was not obliged to share member lists to the State of Alabama because 
of their right to association, which stemmed from “the close nexus between” assembly 
and speech. This case marked the first formalization of the independent right to 
associate.30  
It also was the beginning of the Court using the right to association to protect the 
blossoming Civil Rights Movement, adding yet more complexity to the history of 
 
26 Tocqueville and Reeve, Democracy in America. Volumes I & II. 
27 Bhagwat, “Associational Speech.” 
28 New York ex Rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) 
29 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 
30 NAACP v. Patterson, 357 U.S. 
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assembly and systemic racism in the United States. The Court protected the NAACP in a 
series of cases, including Bates v. City of Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, and Louisiana v. 
NAACP, from sharing their membership lists. These rulings were crucial to the success of 
the NAACP in organizing throughout the Civil Rights Movement.31  
 Communist organizations were not given the same protection. In the proceeding 
Cold War cases Uphaus v. Wyman and Barenblatt v. United States, the Court deemed that 
communist organizations were not protected by association rights.32 When the two 
interests came into conflict in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, the 
Court’s commitment to the NAACP prevailed over their opposition to communist 
organizations. The Florida Legislative Investigative Communities’ inquiries into the 
presence of the Communist party may be legitimate, but any connection to the NAACP 
was insubstantial, and thus could not justify a violation of associational rights.33 
 Seven years after the Court presented association as a standalone right, it created a 
new nontextual right in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), The right to privacy, established 
by drawing on the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, was fashioned to a 
married couple’s access to contraception.34 At the time, the existence of a second 
nontextual right buoyed the legitimacy of association. In the long term, this decision 
came to restrict association. While the early 20th century Court showed hints of 
prioritizing speech over assembly, the focus on intimate interactions in Griswold laid the 
groundwork to limit association to only expressive and intimate interactions.35  
 
31 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 89. 
32 Inazu. 
33 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
34 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
35 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 126. 
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 This distinction was formalized in Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984). The 
Court ruled that an all-male legal organization must accept female members because their 
organization was not adequately intimate or expressive to be afforded association 
protections. This approach meant that simply being an association was no longer enough 
to warrant associative protections—the expressive value also mattered.36 This standard 
was used to strike down two more men-only acceptance policies in the cases Board of 
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte and New York State Club 
Ass’n v. City of New York.37 
The Court used this doctrine again in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), 
which found that the Boy Scouts were a sufficiently expressive association to justify the 
firing of a gay assistant scoutmaster.38 In his dissent, Justice Stevens condemns the Court 
for their ruling, pointing out that no anti-gay message is clearly expressed from the Boy 
Scouts. This contradiction highlights the fallibility of depending on content, rather than 
conduct, in creating tests for freedom of association and assembly. 
 By limiting association in this manner, it quickly became eclipsed by the right to 
free speech. The case Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of 
Boston (1995), which centered on the right of a parade to exclude other groups, was 
decided solely on the ground of expressive content. In Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez, discussion of a Christian group’s right to exclude tied association entirely to 
speech.39  
 
36 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
37 Bhagwat, “Associational Speech.” 988. 
38 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640. 
39 Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge. 
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 The history of association captures a troubling tension that exists in assembly as 
well: just as association was used to protect the NAACP during the Civil Rights 
Movement, it can be used to exclude minorities from preexisting organizations. The 
Court has attempted to avoid this issue by limiting associational rights to expressive and 
intimate groups, but in doing so, they have restricted association to near non-existence. 
So how does the Court salvage the right to assemble and associate? Should they be 
treated interchangeably? 
 In Chapter IV, I will examine several theories from modern scholars on how, 
exactly, we should resuscitate these rights. I'll begin with Nicholas Brod and Tabatha 
Abu El-Haj, who both focus on assembly as in-person gatherings. Abu El-Haj is 
primarily concerned with tracing the history of permit requirements in the United States. 
She argues that the modern permit requirements and assembly restrictions are repressive 
far beyond the norms of the first century in the United States. El-Haj illustrates how 
assembly contributed to a richer political culture, arguing that unrestricted assembly is 
important for democratic governance.40  
Brod shares her concerns over the limitations placed on in-person gatherings. He 
uses the 2010 Occupy Movement as an example of protest that would have been 
constitutionally acceptable 200 years ago but was obstructed by modern regulations. He 
posits that means-end scrutiny should be applied to assemblies, which should be 
identifiable as physical gatherings, not expressive conduct. He emphasizes that with this 
 
40 Abu El-Haj, “The Neglected Right of Assembly.” 
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approach, time and place requirements are often incompatible with the right to assemble 
because so much of the impact of an assembly comes from its time and place.41 
 I will then consider John Inazu’s theory of assembly, which defends the right as a 
means to protect a group’s autonomy, including dissident and nonphysical groups. Inazu 
suggests that freedom of association is no longer sufficient to safeguard group autonomy 
because of its collapse into expression. Instead, Inazu uses the history of assembly and 
association to demonstrate that assembly can reinvigorate both rights. He criticizes the 
influence of 1960s popularism and Rawlsian liberalism on the Court’s freedom of 
association doctrine for excluding dissident groups. Thus, he argues that assembly must 
be understood as protecting peaceable, noncommercial groups.  
 Finally, I consider Ashutosh Bhagwhad’s theory of associational speech. He 
echoes Brod and Inazu’s concern that freedom of association is too tied to speech in 
current Supreme Court doctrine. He argues that the six First Amendment freedoms 
(including assembly) are interdependent in providing true self-governance. Deference to 
speech damages our democratic norms by failing to uphold the other rights. Unlike Inazu, 
Bhagwhad does not see a reinvigorated assembly right as the solution. Instead, he argues 
for an expanded protection of democratic associations, rather than expressive ones.42  
 In Chapter V, I consider the recent events of 2020 and 2021 and place them in the 
context of the broader history of assembly and association in the United States. I focus on 
four main events.  
 
41 Brod, “Rethinking a Reinvigorated Right to Assembly.” 
42 Bhagwat, “Associational Speech.” 
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First, in 2020, the Black Lives Matter movement brought hundreds of thousands 
of Americans to the streets in protest of systemic racism. In response, many of these 
protests were brutally repressed.43 The most public display of assembly suppression came 
from the highest level of government at the Lafayette Square incident on June 1st.44 On 
rare occasions, protests also resulted in property damage, looting, and injury to officers.45 
Drawing on El-Haj's theory, I explore how police violence and curfews served to 
suffocate the free exercise of assembly. I also relate these protests to the long history 
between racial inequality and assembly. Finally, I consider how violent assemblies 
should be prevented. 
Second, I examine the recent decision by the Court in DeRay McKesson v. John 
Doe, in which a police officer sued an organizer for an injury sustained by a protester. I 
point out that the Fifth Circuit’s holding has dangerous implications for guilt-by-
association, while the Supreme Court’s decision matches a pattern of neglect when it 
comes to assembly issues.46  
  In the third section, I discuss the January 6th siege on the Capitol. I emphasize the 
role white privilege played in protecting the rioter’s assembly rights beyond reason and 
use it as an example of the dangers that assemblies can pose. I also consider how 
organizations that operate against democratic principles but believe they are right would 
be treated under the group autonomy theories in Chapter IV.47 
 
43 Buford et al., “We Reviewed Police Tactics Seen in Nearly 400 Protest Videos. Here’s What 
We Found.” 
44 Parker, Dawsey, and Tan, “Inside the Push to Tear-Gas Protesters Ahead of a Trump Photo 
Op.” 
45 Conger and Bogel-Burroughs, “Fact Check.” 
46 DeRay McKesson v. John Doe, 592 U.S; Motala, “‘Foreseeable Violence’ & Black Lives 
Matter.” 
47 Mazzetti et al., “Inside a Deadly Siege.” 
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 Finally, I describe the wave of anti-protest legislation being passed across the 
country and highlight the danger these pose to freedom of assembly. I argue that the 
Court must reinvigorate the right as soon as possible to make sure Americans can still 
freely engage in their own self-governance.48 
 In sum, this thesis seeks to offer a comprehensive summation of assembly rights 
in the United States up to 2020 to demonstrate the importance of a robust right to 
assemble physically and associate freely in democratic governance. In Chapter II, I begin 
by examining the history of assembly, from the First Congress's debate over the 
incorporation of the right in the First Amendment to the disappearance of the right in 
judicial opinions at the end of the 20th century. I turn to the right to associate in Chapter 
III, which became distinct from assembly in NAACP v. Alabama, but has been subsumed 
into speech. This historical context is used to prop up the different modern theories of 
assembly and association that I survey in Chapter IV. By Chapter V, I can consider the 
events of 2020 and 2021 from the scope of the history of assembly. I argue that the right 
has become too restricted and thus cannot play the role it should in self-governance. As a 
result, I argue that assembly must be reinvigorated by the Supreme Court. 
  
 




II. The History of Assembly 
 
 At the time of the founding, the right to assembly was regarded as essential and 
fundamental. It was a right that had belonged to English freeman and traveled across the 
Atlantic with the first settlers. It was considered so fundamental that some felt it was 
unnecessary to include in the Constitution at all. At the First Congress, Theodore 
Sedgwick argued that the right was so obvious that it was unnecessary to elaborate: “If 
people freely converse together they must assemble for that purpose. It is a self-evident, 
inalienable right that the people possess. It is derogatory to the dignity of the House to 
descend to such minutiae."49 
 President Edmund Pendleton referred to the right of assembly in his remarks at 
the Virginia ratifying convention of 1788, before the Bill of Rights was created. It is 
worth including the quote in its entirety to emphasize how much Pendleton saw the right 
to assemble as implicitly guaranteed to the people:  
“We, the people, possessing all power, form a government, such as we think will 
secure happiness: and suppose, in adopting this plan, we should be mistaken in 
the end; where is the cause of alarm on that quarter? In the same plan we point out 
an easy and quiet method of reforming what may be found amiss. No, but, say 
 
49 Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties. 101. 
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gentlemen, we have put the introduction of that method in the hands of our 
servants, who will interrupt it from motives of self-interest. What then? . . . Who 
shall dare to resist the people? No, we will assemble in Convention; wholly recall 
our delegated powers, or reform them so as to prevent such abuse. . . .”50 
In assuaging the fears of a cautious public, Pendleton invokes assembly as the “easy and 
quiet method” of reform. He recognizes the intrinsic power in a gathering of people to 
incite change. The ability to assemble is crucial to real self-governance. Indeed, it was 
such a gathering of people that constructed the system of government Pendleton is 
introducing. By referring to “We, the people,” he suggests that assembly belongs 
naturally to the citizens of any form of government by the people.   
 Assembly was present in American life beyond just the Constitutional 
Convention. Baylen Linnekin identifies taverns as one of the original assembly places in 
American life. He argues that as British acts began to crack down on American freedoms, 
the colonists used formal and informal gatherings to express their grievances.51 Taverns 
became an ideal gathering place, for both the accessibility of alcohol and the “egalitarian 
context”—they were one of the only spaces that allowed guests of all social classes.52 
Treated as a semi-public space, they allowed colonists to assemble and debate regularly, 
including the Founding Fathers.53  
 In this chapter, I will trace the history of assembly in the United States. I begin by 
examining the structure of the clause itself. Looking to state constitutions of the time and 
 
50 Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction. 26. 
51 Linnekin, “Tavern Talk and the Origins of the Assembly Clause.” 598. 
52 Linnekin. 603. 
53 Linnekin, 607. 
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earlier drafts of the First Amendment reveals how assembly should be understood: as a 
right unhindered by expressive requirements.54 I then turn to assembly in the Founding 
Era. Assembly manifested in both spontaneous parades and Democratic-Republican 
societies. It was generally an egalitarian, unrestrained affair.55  
This culture of assembly proceeded into the 19th century, with an important 
caveat. In the Antebellum South, suffocating restrictions were placed on African 
American’s assembly rights—a pattern repeated throughout history.56 After the Civil 
War, the Enforcement Acts were passed in an effort to protect black citizen’s civil 
liberties from white supremacists.57 In the Supreme Court’s first ruling on assembly, 
United States v. Cruikshank, the first Enforcement Act was gutted: the Court ruled that 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the right to assemble to state governments or 
individual actors, reversing a lower court’s holding in United States v. Hall years 
earlier.58 Similarly, while the majority of state courts were striking down ordinances that 
placed restrictions on assembly, the Supreme Court upheld a decision by the only outlier 
state court to allow permit requirements in Davis v. Massachusetts.59 
In the 20th century, assembly rights began to be expanded once more by the 
Supreme Court. Women’s suffrage, the NAACP, and the labor movement all used 
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assembly to further their causes, actualizing the democratic ideals behind the right.60 
Whitney v. California confronted the Court with balancing anti-communist fears and 
assembly rights. It resulted in Justice Brandeis’s famous concurrence in which he 
connected speech and assembly as fundamental, coequal rights.61 Much of this language 
was used in DeJonge v. Oregon ten years later. DeJonge changed the precedence set in 
Cruikshank, applying the First Amendment to state governments. It also recognized the 
important role assembly plays in self-governance, as the Court once more confronted the 
civil liberties of communist organizations.62 
Two years later, the Supreme Court changed its doctrine once more in Hague v. 
CIO. Hague established the public forum doctrine used today, which reserves public 
spaces as protected areas for speech and assembly. In doing so, it changed course from 
Davis. However, it did not hold permit requirements as unconstitutional, which laid the 
groundwork for Cox v. New Hampshire to allow assembly restrictions on the basis of 
public convenience a short while later.63  
Between the rulings of Hague and Cox, assembly hit its peak of cultural 
relevancy. It was heralded as one of the four essential freedoms at the New York World 
Fair in 1940, only to be replaced in President Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech a year 
later.64 
Despite its diminishing popularity, assembly was still an important tool in the 
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, and was recognized as such in speeches by Dr. 
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Martin Luther King Jr. The Court protected protesters repeatedly but chose to never 
decide cases on the grounds of broader principles, thus leaving the right to assemble 
largely ignored.65 
By the 1980s, assembly was almost completely subsumed by speech. Despite the 
treatment of the two rights as coequal years earlier, the Court limited public assembly to 
expressive conduct in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Association. With this change, it became unnecessary to invoke assembly, even in cases 
that centered around a gathering of people.66 As a result, the Court has not decided a case 
on the grounds of assembly in the last thirty years.  
 
Structure of assembly 
Five different state constitutions included explicit protections for assembly when 
the Bill of Rights was ratified by the First Congress.67 The prevalence of assembly 
protections demonstrates how important it was in the political and social lives of the 
Founding generation. The different text of each constitution provides a new perspective 
on how to think about the text of the First Amendment—the most notable difference 
being the inclusion of "common good" as a purpose for assembly in each. 
Article XIX of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 guaranteed the “right, in 
an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good.”68 The 
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New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 repeated the Massachusetts Constitution nearly 
verbatim, replacing “assemble to consult” with “assemble and consult”69 This is a small 
difference with potentially large consequences: whether the right to assemble should be 
constrained by the need to consult for the common good was up for debate at the time. 
The phrasing of the Massachusetts Constitution necessitates this limitation, while the 
New Hampshire phrasing leaves slightly more leeway. The common good is not 
necessarily a suffocating restriction and largely did not act that way in the Founding era. 
Nonetheless, narrow construction of the "common good" has the potential to become 
limiting to assembly. 
Both clauses are followed by similar petition rights. The Massachusetts 
Constitution uses a semi-colon to separate the assembly right from the right to, “give 
instructions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by the way of 
addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the 
grievances they suffer.”70  The New Hampshire Constitution uses the same language, 
except it separates assembly from the rest with just a comma. The difference in 
punctuation is the difference between limiting assembly to petition, or keeping it 
separate. The Massachusetts 1780 Constitution seems to limit assembly to the pursuit of 
the good but leaves it open to contexts outside of petition. New Hampshire does the 
opposite. However, both ultimately reflect a deep commitment to government by the 
people, with assembly as an essential component of that commitment.  
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The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 and the Pennsylvania Constitution of 
1776 separate assembly and the common good in a list. Both assert the right of the 
people, "to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their 
Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances.”71 This 
approach limits assembly in neither of the ways discussed above. 
The final state constitution including assembly at the time was the Vermont 
Constitution of 1776. It used all the same language as North Carolina and Pennsylvania 
but differed in its punctuation, separating “to consult for their common good” and “to 
instruct their representatives” with an em dash.72 This choice could be interpreted as 
limiting the right to consult on public good solely to the means of petition. Unlike the 
other four approaches, the freedom of assembly is left unconstrained in this phrasing, 
while petition is limited. 
With these approaches in mind, we can turn to the language in the United States 
Bill of Rights. The entire First Amendment reads:  
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”73 
Notably, the language in the Bill of Rights excludes any reference to the common good, 
unlike the state constitutions of the time. It also is a much briefer description of petition. 
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Jason Mazzone argues in Freedom’s Association that the text of the First 
Amendment ties together assembly and petition. In other words, the Founders intended to 
limit one's freedom to assemble to petitioning the government. He makes two arguments 
in pursuit of this conclusion. First, the two rights are connected by, “and to petition,” 
while all the prior freedoms are separated by “or.” Second, it is the singular “right” of the 
people to assemble and petition, not the “rights” of the people.74  
John Inazu responds to both these criticisms in Liberty’s Refuge. He argues that 
the comma and “and” before petition can be explained by an earlier draft of the First 
Amendment.  
When the First Congress was originally drafting the Bill of Rights, proposals from 
Virginia, North Carolina, New York, and Rhode Island all included assembly for 
consulting for the common good. The proposal James Madison presented to the House of 
Representatives on June 8th, 1789 read, “The people shall not be restrained from 
peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the 
legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.”75 The use of the 
possessive “their” differed from the proposals by Virginia and North Carolina, which 
both referred to “the common good.” 
The possessive “their” is notable because it prevents the government from 
restricting assembly that might operate against their interests. Pendleton’s 1788 speech 
underscored how assembly is key to self-governance because it allows for organization 
against dysfunctional governments. Gatherings, especially those that have revolutionary 
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intent, are valuable precisely because they are not bound by what the government 
believes is the common good. The use of “their,” places power into the hands of the 
people, allowing them to assemble even if it is against the interest of other institutions.  
This concern was reflected in House debates. On the topic of assembly, Thomas 
Hartley of Pennsylvania argued that anything compatible “with the general good ought to 
be granted.”76 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts sharply disagreed, responding that if “the 
people had a right to consult for the common good” but “could not consult unless they 
met for that purpose,” then Hartley was really “contend[ing] for nothing.”77 In other 
words, the common good could be defined so narrowly by law enforcement and the 
courts that it would prevent the people from being able to meet at all. 
“Their common good” remained in the version of the amendment approved by the 
House in late August of 1789. By then, the text read: “The freedom of speech, and of the 
press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common 
good, and to apply to the  government for redress of grievances shall not be infringed.”78 
Eleven days later, the common good qualifier survived a motion to strike it in the Senate. 
It was not until the next week, when the freedom of religion was added into the 
amendment, that it was dropped without explanation.  
The absence of the common good clause can be taken to have two significant 
impacts. First, its elimination explains the extra comma in the First Amendment. It 
demonstrates the assembly was intended to be separate from petition, and not constrained 
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by it. Second, it shows that assembly should not be constrained by its content. Groups are 
permitted to consult for whatever they wish: it does not need to be in the interest of the 
common good of the United States or the common good of a group of people. This 
distinction leaves room for dissident or unpopular groups to gather despite their views. 
There is still one qualifier to assembly in the First Amendment: the word 
“peaceably.” Dictionaries at the time of the founding define “peaceably” as meaning, 
“without disturbance,” “opposite to war or strife,” and “quietly.”79 Typically, it has been 
interpreted as placing a limit on assembly, by leaving rowdy or violent gatherings without 
constitutional protection. Peaceful assemblies are protected, those causing disturbances 
are not.  
Nicholas Brod offers an alternative interpretation. He suggests that “peaceably” 
may qualify assembly as both a negative and a positive right. It prevents the right from 
extending to violent, out-of-control assemblies. But it also could be read as protecting 
non-violent assemblies from being disrupted. A group of protesters has the right to 
assemble in a park, so long as they are peaceful. At the same time, a group of protesters 
has the right to assemble in a park without disturbance from law enforcement. They may 
assemble in peace.80 Brod argues that this interpretation may require the government to 
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Assembly in the Founding Era 
 Beyond the social life in taverns, assembly manifested itself in Founding-Era life 
in a variety of ways. Festive politics emerged around elections, national holidays, and 
other celebratory events. The merriment included spontaneous parades, bonfires, feasts, 
public meetings, and more.82 Boston’s “biggest public political event” took place in 
celebration of the Battle of Valmy in France on January 24th, 1793.83 Multiple 
processions made their way through town. One was led by carts loaded with food, with 
men, women, and children of all races joining to follow from the rear. Picking up 
thousands of Bostonians, the parade traversed a new route that ended near the State 
House and dissolved into a feast. 
 These gatherings took place without prior permission from the government. 
Rather, they were spontaneous expressions of political celebration. They transcended 
social, racial, and gender lines.84  
 The Philadelphia Independence Day Celebration in 1795 illustrates the outer 
limits of assembly at the time. A counter-procession was organized in protest of the 
Federalist government. Made up of regular citizens, the group proceeded carefully 
through the streets—going so far as to cover wagon wheels to muffle the noise. Despite 
attempts by a militia to disperse them, the procession continued peacefully. The marchers 
understood their assembly could be restricted by its noise and violence, leading to 
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measures like covering the wagon wheel. However, there was no thought that being on 
the streets themselves could constitute an unlawful assembly.85 
 Not all assemblies took the form of celebrations on the street. Democratic-
Republican Societies organized and met privately to criticize the Washington 
administration. The societies explicitly invoked the freedom to assembly to justify their 
creation. For example, the Boston Independent Chronicle argued in 1794 that, “under a 
Constitution which expressly provides ‘That the people have a right in an orderly and 
peaceable manner to assemble and consult upon the common good,’ there can be no 
necessity for an apology to the public for an Association of a number of citizens to 
promote and cherish the social virtues, the love of their country, and a respect for its 
Laws and Constitutions.”86  
Notably, the Independent refers to the right to assemble but applies it to 
associations. Assembly, by their definition, can apply to more permanent organizations, 
as well as public gatherings. Democratic-Republican Societies also illustrated the role 
that assembly played from the very beginning in self-governance. Assembly provided 
cover for dissident groups to gather and critique the government, free of fear and without 
necessitating “apology.”  
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Assembly in the Early 19th Century 
 The festive politics of the late 1700s continued into the 19th century. The 
spontaneous and inclusive revelry in 1793 Boston was mirrored by the celebration in 
Philadelphia in 1830 after the French Revolution.87 Public meetings, to discuss anything 
from local politics to holiday planning, were such a common occurrence that papers in 
New York City included a “Public Meetings” column by the 1840s.88  
 Scholarly writing reflected an understanding of assembly as essential and 
minimally restricted. Benjamin Oliver’s treatise The Rights of an American Citizen, 
published in 1832, describes assembly as “one of the strongest safeguards, against any 
usurpation or tyrannical abuse of power.”89 This assertion underlines how important 
assembly is for democratic self-governance.  
An article from 1844 in American Law Magazine argues that assembly could only 
be regulated once it became unlawful. Quoting from a British case, in which the judge 
ruled that, "the constitution of this country does not (God be thanked) punish persons 
who, meaning to do that which is right in a peaceable and orderly manner” meet “under 
irresponsible presidency,” the author argues that the US legal system has the same 
doctrine with one difference.90 No permission is required from authorities to gather in the 
United States.91  
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 The complicated relationship between black civil rights and assembly began to 
take shape in the 19th century as well. The inclusiveness of street politics offered an 
opportunity to free Black citizens in the North. For example, an annual holiday marking 
the abolition of slavery in the United States was established by Black communities in 
Philadelphia and New York in 1808. This holiday was marked by celebratory parades 
that often ended at a communal meeting place.92 
 In the Antebellum South, something very different was happening. Citizens and 
state legislatures placed severe restrictions on the rights of African Americans to 
assemble. In North Carolina, an 1818 petition requested for legislation to either prevent 
Black Americans from “assembling at musters or to punish them for so doing.”93 Two 
years later, two different petitions in South Carolina sought to ban church services for the 
“exclusive worship” of Black Americans.94 Similar petitions appeared in Mississippi, 
Virginia, and Delaware in subsequent years, all reflecting a desire by white Southerners 
to prevent assembly between Black individuals.95 
 Legislatures passed a variety of restrictions on assembly across the South. Laws 
specifically preventing the gathering of slaves or free Black people existed in Georgia, 
South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, and Alabama.96 
For example, an 1831 law in Virginia makes “All meetings of free Negroes or mulattoes 
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at any school house, church, meeting house or other place for teaching them reading or 
writing, either in the day or the night […] unlawful assembly.”97 
 Abolitionist Thomas Dwight Weld might have put it best when he wrote in 1836 
that “the right of peaceably assembling” had been “violently wrested—the right of 
minorities, rights no longer” from Black Americans by Southern governments.98 Beyond 
politics, these restrictions served to suffocate the social, cultural, and religious lives of the 
Black Americans who lived in the South.  
There two key takeaways: first, white Southerners restricted the right to assemble 
and thus the right to associate because the two were treated as the same. Associations are 
more permanent groups whereas assemblies tend to gather on an ad-hoc basis. The 
gatherings that happen at schools and churches are thus associations by definition. For the 
first 150 years, associations were understood as being protected under the right to 
assemble. In the next chapter, I will discuss what happened after the Supreme Court 
officially separated the two in 1958. 
Second, restrictions on assembly, beyond limiting expression, can diminish a way 
of life. The assembly restrictions in the Antebellum South were not just insidious because 
they prevented Black citizens from gathering to advocate for certain policies. Instead, the 
limits on assemblies prevented that rituals and meetings that build a community. 
Assemblies and associations, like church gatherings or marches, help citizens learn from 
each other, develop an identity and create ties to their community. This civic education is 
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crucial to an informed citizenry in democratic governance. It occurs through assemblies, 
regardless of expressive quality. 
 
Assembly Post-Civil War 
 In 1870, Congress passed the first Enforcement Act in response to the violence of 
the Ku Klux Klan, using the authority given to them by the Fourteenth and Fifteen 
amendments. Along with reaffirming voting rights, the Act criminalizes the two or more 
persons acting "to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to 
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or 
secured to him by the Constitution."99  
In United States v. Hall (1871), several Klansmen were convicted under the 
Enforcement Act for conspiring to violate the speech and assembly rights of Republicans 
after they killed and wounded attendees of a Republican campaign meeting. The Fifth 
Circuit court ruled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expanded 
the application of First Amendment rights to the states because they were rights intrinsic 
to due process. Furthermore, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
meant that failure to take state action was just as punishable as discriminatory legislation. 
Because the national government cannot infringe on the powers of an inactive state 
government, it instead must prosecute the actions of individuals.100  
As a result of Hall, the federal government “had the power to protect freedmen 
not only from discriminatory state legislation but also from ‘state inaction, or 
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incompetency.’”101 This broad conception of assembly and state power was a valuable 
tool in fighting back against the suppression of the KKK.102  
The Supreme Court reversed the Hall ruling in United States v. Cruikshank 
(1875). After a voting controversy in Louisiana, white perpetrators attacked and killed 
between 30 to 50 black citizens. Of the 98 white supremacists indicted under the 
Enforcement Act, only 9 were located and arrested. Of those, only three were 
convicted.103 
The majority opinion limited assembly in two ways. First, by referring to “the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a 
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or duties or national 
government,” the Court implied that assembly was limited just to petition.104 It is possible 
that the Court only intended petition as an example in a list. However, this phrasing was 
used later in Presser v. Illinois when Justice Woods argued that assembly was only 
protected for the purpose of petition—the only time in history that the Court has made 
this limitation explicit. In later cases, the Court has indirectly contradicted this 
assertion.105   
Second, the Court severely limited who could be punished for violating First 
Amendment rights. The majority argued that the First Amendment, “like the other 
amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit the powers 
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of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National 
Government alone.”106 Judicial theories like those in Hall were overturned—state 
governments were not to be constrained by the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
Neither were private citizens. The Court used the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to form their argument, suggesting that its mandate only applied 
to state governments, not interactions between citizens—a change from Hall’s invocation 
of the equal protection clause. Asserting that “the only obligation resting upon the United 
States is to see that the States do not deny” the “equality of the rights of citizens,” the 
Court dismissed the argument that the national government could prosecute individuals in 
response to state inaction.107 
Cruikshank had long-reaching and devasting consequences in the Reconstruction 
South. One historian referred to it as a “green light to acts of terror.”108 Prosecution on 
the grounds of the Enforcement Act was made nearly impossible, which left it largely in 
the hands of white Southerners. It also significantly limited the reach of the Civil War 
amendments, slowing the momentum of Reconstruction.109 
While the Supreme Court confronted few assembly-related cases, state courts 
were rife with activity in the latter half of the 1800s. In the wake of the Civil War, cities 
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began to regulate public spaces more heavily. Legal objections arose in response. Among 
such cases were conflicts over the legality of requiring advanced permission for parades.  
Of the first seven state supreme courts states to confront such cases, all except the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court found such requirements to be unconstitutional.110 Some 
allowed for the possibility of time, place, and manner restrictions—but none found the 
conduct at issue to be disruptive enough to justify the overstep of municipal power.111 A 
running theme in these court decisions was that the strength of US “free and democratic 
institutions” is that “they allow great latitude when the people demonstrate in the street 
for political, religious, and social purposes,” a strength so important that it eclipses the 
inconvenience felt by a passerby.112  
The Massachusetts Supreme Court’s precedence wound up being the most 
influential on the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1897, the Supreme Court 
reviewed Davis v. Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court had argued that municipal 
governments may regulate public places however they please because they belong to the 
government. The Court reaffirmed this, writing, “For the legislature absolutely or 
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an 
infringement on the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private 
house to forbid it in his house.”113 While they would later overturn this definition of 
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public spaces, their implicit acceptance of permission requirements to assemble would 
not change. 114 
 
Assembly in the 20th Century 
 The 20th century is marked by contradiction in the treatment of assembly. Permit 
requirements became a given, but public spaces were made more accessible. Social 
justice and labor movements utilized assembly to fight for their causes, but the US 
government passed restrictive wartime legislation. Assembly became extremely popular 
in political rhetoric and then disappeared from the public consciousness and Supreme 
Court opinions altogether.  
Assembly was key in the women’s movement of the early 1900s. The National 
American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) expanded from 45,000 members in 
1907 to almost 2 million in a decade. Associations like this were key to developing and 
organizing the movement. They also helped develop a civic culture between women. 
Previously, women had been largely isolated to their homes. Meeting together offered 
them an opportunity to develop intellectually and form their own identities.115 
Much of the movement’s growth came from public demonstrations which 
garnered national attention. The Suffragettes began an open-air campaign in 1908 that 
used street meetings, soap-box oration, and picketing to spread their message. Because 
women lacked political power, they were seen as less threatening than other social 
movements, like labor. As a result, they encountered less trouble with obtaining 
 
114 Abu El-Haj, “The Neglected Right of Assembly.” 583. 
115 Lumsden, Rampant Women. xix. 
 39 
permission to use public spaces in the wake of the Davis decision.116 The movement also 
did not limit itself to traditional demonstrations: "banner meetings, balls, swimming 
races, potato sack races, baby shows, meals, pageants, and teatimes” were all used to 
further the cause.117  
The Nineteenth Amendment was passed on August 26th, 1920 after Tennessee 
became the thirty-sixth state to ratify it, enshrining women's right to vote in the US 
Constitution. Both the assemblies and associations of the Suffragettes were key in its 
passage. The National Women's Party used picketing and dramatic protests in 1919 to 
make national news and place pressure on politicians in Washington. Many of the 
picketers were arrested, which only gave the movement more publicity. The NAWSA 
focused its efforts on lobbying, using its cordial relationship with President Woodrow 
Wilson to exert pressure on undecided Congresspeople.118 
 Linda Lumsden argues that the “suffrage movement exemplified how the right of 
assembly can effect change in a democracy.”119 Women did not have the right to vote, so 
they could not influence all-male assemblies by traditional means. Instead, they used 
assemblies in public forums to agitate an indifferent public.120 Because assemblies were 
considered political activity, the use of them by women was revolutionary in and of 
itself.121 She argues that assembly was not just important to suffragettes, but rather is “the 
prism” through which the whole movement can be understood.122 
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 The use of assembly by the suffragettes is instructive in understanding assembly 
as a tool for self-governance. Their ability to access public spaces to disrupt social norms 
and spread their message was essential. The fact that permit requirements were not used 
to stifle movement suggests more about the importance of free access to public forums 
rather than the effectiveness of such regulations. Tactics like this show how the conduct 
of assemblies is just as critical to their end goal and their message.  
Civil rights activists were also able to use assembly to their benefit. The National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) emerged from the first 
National Negro Conference in 1909 and the Universal Negro Improvement Association 
(UNIA) was formed shortly after. Both grew rapidly.123 Associations were not the only 
form of assembly used in this movement—The Harlem Renaissance was marked by 
collaboration between artists and writers in the same community. Free to associate 
together, interactions between the creatives in Harlem resulted in, “a cohesive force in the 
efforts of the group.”124 
The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) formed in 1905 as part of the labor 
movement. In the demonstrations and strikes that occurred across the country afterward, 
the organizers repeatedly invoked speech and assembly to defend their actions. After 
several IWW leaders were arrested during a silk strike, the IWW publication Solidarity 
warned that America “has turned to hoodlumism and a denial of free speech and 
assembly to a large and growing body of citizens.”125  
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  As the eve of World War I approached and fear of communism spread across the 
country, new restrictions on assembly emerged. The Espionage Act of 1917, the 
Immigration Act of 1918, and the Palmer Raids in 1920 all diminished American's ability 
to freely assemble. 
 Communist organizations and assembly came before the Court for the first time in 
Whitney v. California (1927). Anita Whitney was prosecuted for her association with the 
Communist party under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. There is an important 
distinction here: the prosecution’s argument was not that Ms. Whitney herself had 
advocated for violence, but that the organization with which she associated engaged in 
syndicalism.126 Despite this, the majority and concurring opinions focused their 
arguments on speech first and assembly (which is used interchangeably with association 
in both) second. Ultimately, the Court held that the California Act did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment.127  
 Justice Brandeis’s concurrence is seen as one of the most important Court 
opinions on free speech ever. It employs his self-governance argument and is part of the 
series of opinions created with Justice Holmes that established the “clear and present 
danger” test.128 However, assembly also plays an important role in the Whitney 
concurrence. Justice Brandeis treats speech and assembly as coequal, arguing:  
“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to 
make men free to develop their faculties, and that, in its government, the 
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deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. […] that, without free speech 
and assembly, discussion would be futile; that, with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine.”129 
Before Whitney, speech and assembly had only been tied to each other in two previous 
cases. Afterward, the two would be connected hundreds of times.130 What is worth 
emphasizing here is that both are treated with equal importance. Assembly is not a means 
to free speech, but rather a separate entity that is essential to self-governance, the two 
rights being mutually strengthened by each other. Both freedoms contribute to the 
development of citizen's faculties. Men may exchange ideas and form communities in a 
way that transcend just speaking because of assembles. 
 A decade later, the Court was confronted once more with a case featuring 
communist organizations and the right to assemble: De Jonge v. Oregon (1937). Dirk De 
Jonge had been convicted under the Oregon criminal syndicalism law for assisting “in the 
conduct of a public meeting, albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under the auspices 
of the Communist Party”131. The opinion sided with DeJonge and struck down the 
Oregon statute. Most importantly, it applied the right to assembly to the states through the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, changing the precedent set by 
Cruikshank.132 
 De Jonge echoed much of Brandeis’s language from Whitney. Chief Justice 
Hughes argues in the opinion that the Oregon statute’s limitations upon free speech and 
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assembly are too broad to be acceptable. Like Brandies, he treats the rights as equivalent, 
describing assembly as “cognate” and “equally fundamental” to free speech and press.133 
Finally, he invokes self-governance to drive home the importance of these rights. Just as 
Pendleton gestured to assembly as a peaceful means to change government 150 years 
earlier, Chief Justice Hughes argues that “the very foundation of constitutional 
government” comes from the preservation of free speech, press, and assembly because 
they “maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government 
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained 
by peaceful means,” rather than violent ones.134 
 Another landmark case for assembly was decided just two years later. The 
conflict in Hague v. CIO (1939) arose from the New Jersey mayor refusing to issue 
permits to labor groups—like the Committee for Industrial Organization—to speak and 
disseminate information in public parks. The permit denials were part of a larger effort by 
the Mayor to prevent union organizing, though limiting assembly and speech in public 
spaces was one of his best tools.135  
Hague brought the precedence set in Davis v. Massachusetts before the Court. 
Forty years earlier, the Court had held that a preacher was only allowed to use a public 
park for sermons “in such mode and subject to such regulations as the legislature, in its 
wisdom may have deemed proper to prescribe.”136 In Hague, they changed course. The 
Court distinguishes the case from Davis by pointing out that the city ordinance in the 
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latter prohibited activities unrelated to speech and assembly, unlike the New Jersey 
statute. Thus, they have “no occasion to determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the 
Davis case was rightly decided.”137  
 The amicus brief sent by the American Bar Association for Hague “contributed 
significantly” to the Court’s decision.138 It repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
assembly, calling it “an essential element of the American democratic system,” which 
allows citizens to meet for “the discussion of their ideas and problems—religious, 
political, economic or social.” It also asserted that protecting assembly should take large 
precedence over public disorder, stating that public officials have the “duty to make the 
right of free assembly prevail over the forces of  disorder if by any reasonable effort or 
means they can possibly do so.”139  
The American Bar Association’s brief extended beyond the arguments made by 
the CIO. They emphasized how the New Jersey mayor’s actions violated the principle of 
peaceable assembly, and thus one of the central tenets of American governance. The CIO 
chose to limit their arguments to the discrimination they suffered during permitting.140 
But it is the broad principle of assembly on which the Hague decision is based.  
The decision argues that “use of the streets and public places has, from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”141 They 
acknowledge that assembly is not an absolute right, but insist that “it must not, under the 
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guise of regulation, be abridge or denied.”142 The Hague decision also created the public 
forum doctrine. It protected public areas as places of speech and assembly which may not 
be irrationally denied from citizens. To do so, the Court invoked the history of the United 
States, describing how “[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly.”143 
 Around the time Hague was decided, assembly was hitting a cultural high point. 
The labor movement in the United States was becoming more popular, and as a result, so 
was the freedom to assemble. In 1936, Congress held hearings on the “violations of the 
rights of free speech and assembly” against unions. The La Follette Committee was 
created to investigate these concerns. Five years late, the committee concluded, tying 
economic conflict to extreme violations of civil liberties and referring to association as 
“the result of the exercise of the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly”—not 
just assembly, as the Court had been.144 
 Conflict in Europe before World War II also brought assembly into political 
rhetoric. Herbert Hoover included assembly as one of the “invisible sentinels which 
guard the door of every home from invasion of coercion, of intimidation and fear” in 
opposition to “Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Communist Russia” and others in a 1935 
speech.145 Meanwhile, Harold Ickes, the interior secretary to President Roosevelt, 
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suggested that freedom of speech, press, and assembly were the only rights essential to 
ensuring, “anchorage for the mooring of our good ship America.”146 
 At the 1939 World Fair in New York, assembly took center stage as one of “Four 
Freedoms.” Celebrating the freedoms of assembly, religion, speech, and press was the 
idea of Arthur Sulzberger, president and publisher of the New York Times. The president 
of the fair later described Salzberger’s vision: 
“[W]e could teach the millions of visitors to the fair a lesson in history with a 
moral. The lesson is that freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom of 
assembly and freedom of speech, firmly fixed in the cornerstone of our 
government since the days of Washington, have enabled us to build the most 
successful democracy in the world. And the moral is that as long as these 
freedoms remain a part of our constitutional set-up we can face the problems of 
tomorrow, a nation of people calm, united and unafraid.”147 
Salzberger’s vision underscores the connection between democratic governance and 
assembly. From the beginning of the American experiment, assembly was an essential 
component. Including it among the four freedoms acknowledges this importance. 
 In the lead up to the World Fair, some went so far as to call assembly the most 
crucial of the four. Dorothy Thompson, the “First Lady of American journalism” whose 
tri-weekly syndicated column had eight to ten million readers, dubbed it the most 
essential.148 On her New Year’s Day radio broadcast, she argued that assembly is “the 
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guaranty of the three other rights.”149 Discussions, speeches, community gatherings, 
religious worship, and publication all rely on the ability of people to gather.  
 The Hague decision was released a month after the opening of the fair. The New 
York Times declared that "with the right of assembly reasserted, all 'four freedoms' of 
[the] Constitution are well established.”150 By the end of 1940, a poll found that 89.9% of 
Americans thought restrictions on freedom of assembly would diminish their personal 
liberties. Only 81.5% of respondents said the same for freedom of speech by press and 
radio.151 
 
Assembly on the Decline 
 Assembly’s cultural popularity was not to last. President Roosevelt's State of the 
Union address on January 6, 1941, also included "four essential freedoms": freedom of 
speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. 
Assembly had not made the cut. Instead, President Roosevelt presented his four freedoms 
as promising a world free of tyranny.152  
He used the United States as an example of these freedoms, arguing, “[s]ince the 
beginning of our American history, we have been engaged in change—in a perpetual 
peaceful revolution—a revolution which goes on steadily, quietly adjusting itself to 
changing conditions—without the concentration camp or the quick-lime in the ditch.”153 
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His reasoning fails to acknowledge the role that assembly has played in the “perpetual 
peaceful revolution.” Assembly, for protest, discussion, and celebration, was essential to 
the formation of the US government and its subsequent evolution. They are how men and 
women can meet peacefully to reform their government through legislation and 
amendment. 
 President Roosevelt’s four freedoms quickly overtook those of the World Fair. 
They were added into the Atlantic Charter by Roosevelt and Churchill. Norman Rockwell 
created four paintings in response and Walter Russell was commissioned to create a 
statue. The Saturday Evening Post printed essays on each freedom. Assembly was not 
eradicated from the public mind but it had suffered a serious blow. Its exclusion from the 
four freedoms implied that “freedom of speech and expression” could sufficiently protect 
gatherings of citizens for exchanging ideas. This assumption is erroneous. There are 
crucial ways that assemblies operate independently of their expression to develop norms 
of self-governance.154  
 The Court decided Cox v. New Hampshire in 1941. A large group of Jehovah 
Witnesses had paraded through Manchester, New Hampshire without first obtaining a 
permit. The Court found that this violated the Manchester ordinance, ruling that “the 
authority of a municipality to impose regulations to assure the safety and convenience of 
the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with 
civil liberties, but, rather, as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which 
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they ultimately depend.”155 As a result, the Court justified placing “time, place, and 
manner” restrictions on public streets “in relation to the other proper uses of streets.”156 
Treating permit requirements as “a means of safeguarding the good” was a shift 
from earlier decisions like Hague which emphasized preserving assembly over regulation 
as much as possible. It suggests that public convenience was more important than public 
assembly.  
The assertion that such restrictions had “never been regarded as inconsistent with 
civil liberties” also ignored the long history of spontaneous assembly in the United States, 
especially in the Founding era. When gatherings are limited by permit requirements, there 
are two consequences: they cannot respond immediately to current events and they 
cannot always access the forums that would make their assembly impactful.  
For example, the celebrations after the Battle of Valmy in Boston were 
spontaneous affairs. Because none of the marches celebrating the victory had to obtain 
permission to use public streets, they could immediately react to  news. This groundswell 
celebration strengthens the political awareness of its participants. The fact that the 
marches could freely use the streets also allowed them to spread the celebration across 
Boston. Indeed, many of the parades picked up marchers as they went along. Permit 
requirements that limit access to certain spaces prevent assemblies from having as 
expansive of an impact.   
 As the United States descended into World War II, new restrictions were placed 
on assembly. Concern over communism grew. After Pearl Harbor, the civil liberties of 
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Japanese Americans were egregiously restricted. The FBI reportedly feared that "the very 
gathering of  Japanese Americans into a group guaranteed that suspicious activities would 
take place,” which in turn justified the creation of repressive internment camps.157  
Assembly experienced a slight resurgence during the Civil Rights Movement for 
the protection it afforded to protests and demonstrations. The Movement used various 
forms of assembly as political protest. The Greensboro Sit-Ins involved black protesters 
sitting at segregated lunch and led to the desegregation of eating places across the United 
States.158 The March on Washington in 1963 brought 200,000 peaceful protesters to the 
Lincoln Memorial in support of racial equality.159 Two years later, thousands marched 
from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama in support of voting rights. 160 
The march in Selma was organized after a peaceful protest against black voter 
disenfranchisement was met with brutal, violent suppression by police forces. The tactics 
used were disproportionate to the extreme; the methods were “similar to those 
recommended for use by the United States Army to quell armed rioters in occupied 
countries.”161  
In return, civil rights leaders organized a four-day march from Selma to 
Montgomery, Alabama down U.S. Highway 80. They sought a federal permit protecting 
their march in the case Williams v. Wallace. In deciding to grant the permit, Judge 
Johnson deviated from First Amendment doctrine. Highways are a non-public forum, 
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leaving the government free to regulate them to prioritize public convenience.162 
However, Judge Johnson argued that:  
“the extent of a group's constitutional right to protest peaceably and petition one's 
government for redress of grievances must be, if our American Constitution is to 
be a flexible and ‘living’ document, found and held to be commensurate with the 
enormity of the wrongs being protested and petitioned against.”163 
This reasoning both celebrates and stifles assembly. On one hand, it recognizes the 
importance of assembly in self-governance. It is essential to the expression of grievance 
against the governance. On the other hand, it implies that assembly must have a purpose 
to be justified in its protection.  
This approach is different from how the Founders envisioned it when they choose 
to leave assembly free of limitations, even the common good. An assembly would only 
be dispersed once it became a nuisance or riotous; the content was not figured into the 
protections it was granted, only its conduct.164 The approach by Judge Johnson inverts 
this. This precedence is dangerous for dissident groups whose intentions might be widely 
regarded as unimportant. Indeed, depending on the judge they encountered, the NAACP 
might be denied protections under the very same test. 
Assembly was also referenced by Martin Luther King Jr. in his writings and 
speeches, including the prophetic “I Have Been to the Mountaintop” speech.165 After 
being arrested in Alabama while protesting for voting rights, he wrote “Letter from a 
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Birmingham Jail” from his cell. In the letter, he specifically references the permitting of 
parades, arguing, “such an ordinance becomes unjust when it is used to maintain 
segregation and to deny citizens the First-Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and 
protest.”166 His complaint echoes that of labor unions in Hague.  
By the 1960s, assembly was only used by the Court to overturn convictions of 
peaceful protesters in the Civil Rights Movement. Judicially, freedom of speech had 
expanded to protect much of what might have been decided under assembly. This shift 
can be traced back to Justice Brandeis’s connection between “free speech and assembly” 
in Whitney, although he had treated the two as coequals. 
The Court ruled on almost 30 cases that centered on convictions of peaceful 
protesters, usually attendees to sit-ins, in the early 1960s. They limited their rulings to 
narrow grounds like that protesters maintained peaceful conduct or city ordinances 
compelling segregation were to blame. By doing so, the Court dodged broader rulings 
about the nature of assembly and protest in semi-public spaces, while still supporting the 
Civil Rights Movement.167 In contrast, the Court chose to extend their argument in Hague 
to broader principles, rather than focus on the discrimination suffered by the CIO.  
Overall, the Civil Rights Movement demonstrated the tension that has existed 
between black liberation movements and the freedom to assemble since the founding. 
Assembly remains one of the best tools to express grievances and promote peaceful, 
democratic change. It also can be suppressed through legislation, petitions, and Court 
rulings. Both these realities existed in the 1960s. 
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 In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association (1983), the 
Court decided that school mail faculties could not be considered “public forum” and 
struck down Perry Logical Educator’s Associations complaint. The opinion included that, 
“in quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative 
activity" and that time, place, and manner restrictions must "leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication."168 In doing so, the use of public forums was restricted 
solely to communicative activities. Assembly may occur only as an expressive act and 
even then, so long as the government leaves open channels for speech, assemblies may be 
prevented entirely. This shift meant that the Court could discuss cases involving 
assembly in public forums without mentioning assembly itself. Instead, cases could be 
decided on the grounds of free speech. 
 The impact of this change is evident. The Supreme Court has not ruled on a case 
on the grounds of assembly for the last thirty years. 
 
Conclusion 
 Assembly has changed significantly throughout the history of the United States. 
However, there are fundamental conflicts that continually arise around it. Whether or not 
assembly needs to be driven by a purpose was at issue when the First Congress was 
debating the phrasing of the First Amendment. It emerged in a different light in the Selma 
case, where assembly was extended precisely for its intended purpose. But in Perry, 
assembly was limited to “communicative activity.” This choice not only led to 
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assembly’s elimination from Supreme Court decisions, but also leads to strong limits on 
the right to association which I will explore in the next chapter. 
 There is also the inescapable tension between the value and cost of assembly. 
Assembly is an essential freedom in a democratic society. It allows for groups to gather, 
exchange thoughts, protest, petition their government, and generate change. The 
importance of the act of assembly cannot be overstated: it is why there is a US 
Constitution in the first place. The use of public protest and the exchange of ideas in 
places like taverns were instrumental in developing public opposition to Britain. The 
meetings that drafted the Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution were also 
assemblies. Had those men not been able to meet and exchange ideas, the system of 
democratic governance which we have today would never have been formed. 
This principle is at odds with the practicality of implementation. Throughout the 
first century, assembly was left largely unimpeded by regulations. Davis v. Massachusetts 
changed this, handing public spaces over to the control of local government. Though 
Hague would later reverse the decision, assembly would never again to unlimited by 
retractions in Supreme Court doctrine, as solidified in Cox. This decision is 
understandable: public spaces are for all public uses, not just assembly. 
However, drawing lines on when assembly becomes too disruptive is difficult. 
This problem is illustrated by various social movements. Labor unions and communist 
organizations both found themselves denied permits and meeting spaces—and thus 
assembly—because of their causes. The syndicalism laws in DeJonge and permit denial 
in Hague are examples of this. Suffragettes avoided the same degree of persecution 
because they were perceived as less threatening because of their class and lack of 
 55 
political status. Still, they encountered their own troubles with violent law enforcement 
and arrest while petitioning. 
 No group of Americans has experienced more contradiction with the freedom to 
assemble than Black citizens. Parades were used to celebrate Black liberation before the 
civil war, the NAACP and Harlem Renaissance both began under the protection of 
assembly, and demonstrations were key to the 1960s Civil Rights Movement—which had 
the support of the Supreme Court. At the same time, the Antebellum South placed 
extreme restrictions on all forms of assembly by Black citizens, suffocating their 
political, social, and religious lives. After the Civil War, the Supreme Court ruled on 
Cruikshank and limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, taking away the 
protections offered by the Enforcement Act and First Amendment. And during the Civil 
Rights Movements, permits were repeatedly denied, and peaceful protests were broken 
up by violence from law enforcement. As association became its own freedom separate 
from assembly, these same contradictions were carried over.  
 In sum, this chapter followed the evolution of assembly in the United States. It 
began with the formation of the First Amendment right, unconstrained by the common 
good or by petition. I explored assembly in the Founding Era, from boisterous 
celebrations in Boston and quiet dissident marches in Philadelphia, to partisan debate 
clubs under Federalist administrations. Then, I tracked assembly through the 19th century, 
as it was repeatedly denied to Black citizens in the South but protected from permit or 
public space requirements by state courts. In the 20th century, I showed how the First 
Amendment was applied to the states, how the public forum doctrine was established, 
and how permit requirements became acceptable. Assembly was used by women’s 
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suffrage movements, labor organizations, and civil rights movements to advocate for 
change. Finally, assembly reached a cultural high in 1940, only to become irrelevant by 
the 1980s. 
I will explore the history of association in the next chapter. Association emerged 
as a new means to protect the NAACP during the Civil Rights Movement. Through 
litigation, it was repeatedly denied to communist organizations. The advent of the right to 
privacy complicated association, by making it stronger as an independent entity but more 
limited as it applied to intimate and expressive associations. By the close of the 20th 





III. History of Association 
 
 Association became an independent, nontextual right in 1958. But it has existed as 
a part of US political philosophy and legal doctrine since the Founding.  
 Assembly and association carry distinct meanings. Definitions in the Oxford 
English Dictionary from the 18th century reveal these differences. Assembly was 
understood to refer to ad hoc gatherings of people, whereas associations were more or 
less permanent groups—collections who “have combined to execute a common 
purpose.”169 Both were considered forums at which citizens may engage in self-
government. In this sense, the two can be used interchangeably. 
 Whether or not the Founders intended to make this distinction is debatable. The 
word “assemble” is used twice in the Constitution, both referencing Congress. Article I, 
Section 3 declares that the First Senate will be "assembled" and then divided into 
staggered reelection years.170 Article I, Section 4 mandates that “Congress shall assemble 
at least once in every Year.”171 Both uses specify the gathering of a permanent group—
Congress—who works for the end purpose of governance. Thus, the references to 
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assembly in the Constitution imply the existence of associations. The protection of 
assembly in the Bill of Rights necessitates subsequent protections for such associations. 
 In the last chapter, I explored the history of the right to assemble in the US, 
beginning with the Founding era. How assembly was treated and used in this time varies 
dramatically from how it is treated today. There has been a shift in perspective. Whereas 
assemblies were widely seen as a crucial part of democratic governance, they have since 
come to be treated merely as means to free speech.  
In the Founding era, assemblies were essential to festive politics. Most of these 
assemblies were not expressive by the Court's standard; they did not have a clear end goal 
or list of demands. But gatherings like parades to celebrate holidays, feasts on voting 
days, and meetings at taverns to discuss current events made up a civic life that kept the 
citizenry informed and engaged with governance.172 
This understanding of assembly as fundamental to democratic government has 
eroded through time. Permit requirements were placed on gatherings to restrict them, the 
public forum doctrine was created, and eventually, the right became secondary to speech. 
Still, assemblies remained an important part of American life. The suffragettes, labor 
movement, and NAACP all used assembly as a means to pursue real democratic 
governance.173 The suffragette's fight for the vote is especially emblematic of how 
assemblies are an important part of political representation.174  
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This pattern is useful for contextualizing the treatment of free association. After 
being separated from assembly, association remained a crucial part of self-governance in 
the United States. Specifically, it was used to great success during the Civil Rights 
Movement to protect the NAACP. As I show, association too became consumed by 
expressive requirements which confuse the ultimate purpose of the freedom by being too 
restrictive.  
This chapter will build on the history of assembly in Chapter II in two ways. First, 
it will expand on the dangers of group rights being treated as a means to free speech. The 
devolution of association into expression is more gradual, and thus more reveals more 
about the repercussions. Second, it will highlight the way modern associations have used, 
or attempted to use, freedom of association to influence democratic change. 
 To begin this chapter, I will consider Alexis de Tocqueville's description of 
associations in American life. His argument highlights how association can be 
distinguished from assembly and the unique role it plays in a democratic society.175 I then 
consider three cases decided before 1958 which center on association: Whitney v. 
California (1927), Bryant v. Zimmerman (1928), and Bridges v. Wixon (1945). These 
cases offer insight into how association was treated before it became a formalized right. 
The Court continually emphasizes the balance between state interest and individual 
liberties, while also recognizing the importance associations have to democratic 
governance. Bryant offers a new perspective on Tocqueville’s theories. Bridges and 
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Whitney both deal with the threat of communism, a pattern that arises again after freedom 
of association is officially established.176 
 In 1958, the Court decided the landmark case NAACP v. Alabama and establishes 
the right to association. There are two valuable takeaways from this decision: first, in the 
decision, the Court sets up associational freedom by partially tying it to its expressive 
purpose. This begins a trend that will eventually lead to the elimination of association in 
favor of speech. Second, NAACP has remarkable similarities to Bryant. Its differences 
offer a valuable perspective on the purpose of association in the United States.177 
 After NAACP, freedom of association was used to protect the racial equality 
movement. I point to Bates v. City of Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, and Louisiana v. 
NAACP as cases that all protected the NAACP’s activities in the South. In each of these 
cases, association is connected less and less to assembly and more to expression.178  
 In contrast, the cases from the same time relating to communist organizations 
prioritized state interest over free association. Uphaus v. Wyman and Barenblatt v. United 
States, both decided immediately after NAACP, exemplify this dichotomy.179 The pattern 
continued in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) and Scales 
v. United States. In each, the Court uses a balancing on compelling state interest to deny 
individual freedoms because of the ideology of communism.180 
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 The Court’s interest in protecting the NAACP and opposition to Communism was 
brought to a head in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee. After the 
turnover of two Justices, the Court maintained its commitment to the NAACP in a 5-4 
decision. The opinion turns on associational freedom—assembly is only mentioned in the 
concurrence and is constrained to its expressive value.181 
 The next landmark case I discuss was almost one based on freedom of 
association—Griswold v. Connecticut. Decided in 1972, Griswold established the right to 
privacy—the second formal nontextual right created by the Supreme Court. While the 
original draft of the decision focused on association, the expressive limitations the Court 
had placed on it in earlier decisions made it a weak legal argument. Instead, the right to 
privacy was created by drawing on the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Aments. 
Privacy strengthened the legitimacy of association as another non-textual right. But it 
would come to limit association in the Roberts decision a decade later.182 
 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court created a new test for association 
that protected two different sorts of organizations: expressive associations and intimate 
associations. By formalizing these distinctions, association was made secondary to 
speech and privacy because it protected associations only engaged in those two 
activities.183 The fallibility of defining associations by their expressive content was made 
clear in the 5-4 decision Boy Scouts of American v. Dale, which centered on whether or 
not the Boy Scouts were expressively anti-gay.184  
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As a result of Roberts, association became eclipsed by speech in the later 
decisions Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., and 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. Like assembly in Perry Education Association thirty 
earlier, the Court found it was able to sufficiently decide association cases on speech 
grounds because association had been constrained so completely to expression.185 
 
Tocqueville on Association 
 Alexis de Tocqueville expounds on the benefits of associations in US political life 
in Democracy in America. His observations are valuable both for those that are accurate 
and those that have proven to be false.  
Tocqueville argues that free associations are uniquely suited to and especially 
important for the United States. In the United States, associations are a “dangerous 
expedient […] used to obviate a still more formidable danger”—tyranny of the 
majority.186 It is precisely because the United States is a democracy that association is so 
essential. The freedom allows minority groups to organize against whoever is in power, 
an important restriction in a system designed to empower the majority. In other systems 
of government, like aristocracies, protecting the minority is less important. The liberty of 
association is also “unbounded” in the United States. This quality makes it less dangerous 
by preventing conspiracies. Where there is total freedom of association, “secret societies 
are unknown.”187 
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 He contrasts the US system with European systems to emphasize the well-
suitedness of free association to the United States. Associations in America are used 
peaceably and legally, as citizens in the minority organize “in the first place, to show 
their numerical strength, and so to diminish the moral authority of the majority; and, in 
the second place, to stimulate competition, and to discover those arguments which are 
most fitted to act upon the majority.”188 In contrast, he suggests Europeans are inclined to 
use association “as a weapon” to create immediate conflict against their opponent.189 This 
is why associations are a “dangerous expedient”: they can quickly turn from a group that 
advocates for different opinions to a group that enforces those opinions, often through 
violence. 
 Tocqueville identifies two key causes of this difference. First, opinions in US 
society are divided by “mere differences of hue,” whereas in Europe, there are multiple 
parties that find themselves diametrically opposed. This extreme disparity inclines an 
association to take more drastic action, like attacking the government. Second, the United 
States has universal suffrage, which means the majority in power is always reflective of 
the majority of citizens. Tracking the opinion of the majority is more challenging when 
there is no universal suffrage. 
  These last two arguments are important to take note of while tracing the history 
of assembly and association. First, Tocqueville’s warning about diametrically opposed 
associations applies to several different groups in US history, like the KKK and the 
Communist Party. His theory offers insights into these cases. Second, universal suffrage 
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did not actually exist in the United States when Democracy in America was written in 
1830—only white men could vote.190 Freedom of association and assembly was 
important in fighting for voting rights, for both women and black citizens, as illustrated in 
the last chapter. 
 
Pre-1958 Association 
 The close connection between assembly and association is undeniable in US 
jurisprudence: the Supreme Court used the two terms interchangeably for 150 years.191 
That being said, the meanings of the two words are distinct enough that there are cases 
where the Court chose to focus mainly on association. The three decisions which did so 
prior to 1958 are Whitney v. California (1927), Bryant v. Zimmerman (1928), and Bridges 
v. Wixon (1945).192 Fittingly, these three cases all relate to social movements which 
would become extremely relevant to the freedom of association after its coining: Black 
civil rights and communist organizing. 
 In Whitney, which I explored last chapter, the Court found that the California 
Criminal Syndicalism Act, which made anyone who, “is or knowingly becomes a 
member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or 
assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism” a felon, was detailed 
enough to not violate due process. Justice Sanford, who wrote the majority opinion, 
explicitly recognized the right to association, stating that the act did not violate the Due 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not a significant restraint on 
“the rights of free speech, assembly, and association.”193 As such, Ms. Whitney’s 
participation in the Resolution Committee of the Communist Labor Party was sufficient 
to indict her under the Act.194 
 While Justice Brandeis’s concurrence is mainly focused on speech and assembly, 
Justice Sanford concludes with a discussion of association. He recognizes that the 
“essence of the offense” under the California act is “combining with others in an 
association for the accomplishment of the desired ends through the advocacy and use of 
criminal and unlawful means.”195 This terminology invokes the distinction between 
assembly and association discussed above; the former tends to be ad hoc, while the latter 
is semi-permanent. It is also notable because the act itself refers to “assemblages” and 
groups who “assemble.” The choice by the Court to discuss assembly reflects an 
understanding of how closely tied the two rights are.  
It also allows the Court to argue that associations are uniquely dangerous and hold 
that the restrictions placed on association were acceptable under the California act.196 
Assemblies and associations both involve group gatherings. The cohesive action of many 
is naturally more dangerous than the actions of one because of their size. So, an 
independent right like speech does not pose the same threat as a group right. Associations 
then transcend assemblies in risk because they imply a longer planning period. A more 
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permanent organization is capable of creating more dramatic action because of 
planning.197  
For example, the Constitutional Convention was a long-term assembly of men. 
Over four months, the gathering created a draft of the US Constitution. This gathering 
was not spontaneous or brief. Instead, it was the drawn-out nature of the association that 
resulted in its larger impact. Associations thus can be more threatening and more crucial 
than traditional assemblies.198   
 The danger that associations can uniquely pose was at issue once more in Bryant 
v. Zimmerman (1928). The case centered on the membership lists of the Ku Klux Klan in 
New York, an issue that would arise again thirty years later for a very different 
organization, the NAACP. In Bryant, a New York regulation required associations with 
oath-bound memberships to file their constitutions and lists of their members, or risk 
being arrested. Mr. Bryant objected to this regulation after his arrest, arguing that it 
violated the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unfairly 
targeted members of the KKK. The Court ruled against Mr. Bryant on both counts.199  
 The Court does not mention assembly once in the opinion. Instead, they focus on 
association. First, the Court argues that requiring membership lists is not a violation of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because any 
protections afforded to “a member of a secret, oath-bound association within a state” 
must be a result of state protections, not US citizenship.200 Next, they argue that the 
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“rightful exertion of the police power” takes priority over Mr. Bryant's freedom of 
association under the Due Process Clause.201 Beyond a doubt, the state of New York may 
reasonably regulate associations to protect the rights of others. Finally, the Court found 
that assigning different levels of regulation to different associations did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, labor unions and the KKK are different enough 
associations—in terms of when they meet, their activities, and their level of secrecy—that 
New York may regulate the KKK more tightly than unions.202 
 Bryant is a case that offers a new perspective on Alexis de Tocqueville’s theories 
from a century earlier. The KKK is an association that encapsulates much of what 
Tocqueville said associations in the US were not. The KKK in New York operated 
largely in secret: meeting at night, wearing hoods and gowns, and so on.203 Whereas 
Tocqueville argued that the unhindered freedom of association in the United States would 
prevent the formation of secret societies, the regulations placed on the KKK existed 
precisely because they were a secret society.  
The reason for the secrecy of the KKK can be surmised out of its purpose. The 
Court in Bryant described the KKK as an organization that "exercises activities tending to 
the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of [New York] citizens" and does "things 
calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people."204 These activities are the 
weaponization of association which Tocqueville feared. The calculated, attacking actions 
taken because of sharp prejudice to another group are those he warned would be born 
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from associations in Europe. The violence of the KKK is what requires the group to be 
more heavily regulated, which in turn is why the group turns to secrecy. The cycle is self-
fulfilling and presents a necessary check on the freedom of association. 
 The third case to invoke the right to association in the early 20th century was 
Bridges v. Wixon (1945), which had several similarities to Whitney. Harry Bridges was an 
immigrant from Australia who had joined the Communist party. Multiple attempts were 
made to deport him under laws that criminalized affiliations with the party. The majority 
opinion rejected the efforts to deport Mr. Bridges, arguing that freedom of speech and 
press protected all the activities associated with the Communist party in which Mr. 
Bridges partook.205  
 The concurrence by Justice Murphy includes an explicit endorsement of the right 
to assemble. He agrees with the Court’s arguments that the deportation proceedings 
defined affiliation too broadly and misused hearsay statements. He then points to a 
broader constitutional issue; unlike what the defendants argued, the power of Congress to 
deport resident aliens is checked by constitutionally guaranteed rights like “free speech 
and association.”206 Furthermore, such legislation violates the principle of personal guilt 
by making Mr. Bridges guilty by association. None of his personal actions advocated for 
the violent overthrow of the US government, though parts of the Communist Party 
ideology may do so.207 
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 In Bridges, the Court protected Mr. Bridge’s affiliation with the Communist party. 
As fear of communism spread across the United States in the wake of World War II, the 
Court would turn away from such protections. Instead, the overthrow of capitalism 
advocated by the party would become the grounds on which the Court denied 
associational rights to US citizens. This shift highlights how important association 
protections of dissident groups can be: what was included in the ideology of the 
Communist party did not change between Bridges and future cases, but the political 
climate of the United States did. 208 
  
Establishing Association 
 Though association was used in specific cases prior to 1958, it had never been 
established as a formal right. Crucially, only assembly is guaranteed in the text of the 
First Amendment. In 1958, the case which is largely seen as establishing the freedom to 
associate as an independent right was decided. This case was NAACP v. Alabama. 
 In 1956, the Alabama chapter of the NAACP was sued by the state attorney 
general John Patterson for failing to register as a foreign corporation because the NAACP 
headquarters was in New York.209 The state trial court ruled in favor of Patterson, forcing 
the NAACP to stop further activities. In response, the NAACP provided all the necessary 
data for registration at the court’s order, except for their membership lists. The state court 
held the NAACP in contempt and fined them $100,000 for failing to produce the lists. 
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The US Supreme Court granted the NAACP certiorari after the Alabama Supreme Court 
refused to do so.210 
 The Court’s opinion, penned by Justice Harlan, was unanimous. After denying 
Alabama’s claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction and asserting that the NAACP has 
sufficient standing, the Court turns to the meat of the issue. They hold that “whatever 
interest the State may have in obtaining the names of petitioner’s ordinary members, it 
has not been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections to 
the production order.” 211 To prove this, Justice Harlan elaborates on the NAACP’s 
constitutional objections. Invoking de Jonge, he writes: 
“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has 
more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the 
freedoms of speech and assembly [… ] It is beyond debate that freedom to engage 
in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of 
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which embraces freedom of speech.”  
This is the first invocation of association by the Court in the opinion. It initially styles 
association as a secondary right to speech and assembly by suggesting that association 
“enhances” the other two rights.  
Throughout the rest of the opinion, however, association is elevated to status as an 
independent right. Justice Harlan refers to the “freedom” or “right” of association seven 
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different times. He also describes “indispensable liberties” as “speech, press, or 
association,” signaling that it should be held as equal to textual freedoms.212 
 Having established the freedom of association, Justice Harlan then argues that 
Alabama has violated the NAACP’s right to association through legislation that 
discourages it—even if they did not outright prevent associating. Specifically, forcing the 
release of membership lists can substantially diminish participation in the NAACP. 
Justice Harlan argues that "inviolability of privacy in group association may in many 
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly 
where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”213 The NAACP, which fights for the 
advancement of Black American’s welfare, would be especially unpopular in Alabama 
during the Civil Rights Movement. Their promotion of racial equality meant that 
previous revelations of rank-and-file members had “exposed these members to economic 
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of 
public hostility.”214  
 With this impact in mind, the opinion finally turns to whether Alabama can justify 
the burden they place on the NAACP’s right to associate by requiring the release of 
membership lists. Weighing both sides, the Court concludes that the regulations from the 
Alabama law are too oppressive on the rights of the NAACP.215 
Before moving on, it is valuable to note how Justice Harlan presents association. 
It is a coequal right, but its function is to advance speech. Whereas assembly is not 
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limited to one purpose, association is “for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.”216 The 
subject is not limited, as it may “pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural 
matters.”217 But the expectation is that an association is meant to pursue something 
expressive. This minor difference is important because of how the right to associate has 
modernized and largely been eclipsed by freedom of speech. 
NAACP also bears significant similarities to Bryant. Both center on the 
membership lists of controversial associations. Both invoke freedom of association.  
However, the two cases ended very differently. The Court emphasizes the importance of 
police power in Bryant but protects the privacy of the NAACP in NAACP. 
Justice Harlan addresses this divergence in the NAACP opinion. He argues that 
the cases are different because of the nature of the organizations themselves, a factor that 
the Court in Bryant relied on. The unlawful activities associated with the KKK justify the 
prioritization of police power. The NAACP does not meet the same standard because its 
activities are all non-violent and lawful.218   
Again, Tocqueville’s theory of association can be instructive here. An 
association’s privacy is distinct from the association being secretive. The organizing of 
the NAACP in the South represents the organizing of a minority in the face of a majority 
to advocate for different ideas—a purpose emblematic of the democratic value of 
association. The NAACP’s work to promote voting rights furthers the effectiveness of 
 
216 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 460. 
217 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 460. 
218 NAACP v. Patterson, 357 U.S. 465-466. 
 73 
associations in US society by promoting universal suffrage.219 On the whole, the group 
represents the sort of association that Tocqueville’s theory would want to protect. 
Two years later, the Court decided on another case involving membership lists 
and the NAACP. In Bates v. City of Little Rock (1960), two petitioners from the NAACP 
were convicted and fined under an Alabama tax ordinance for failing to provide 
membership lists of local branches. The Court held in favor of the NAACP once more.220 
There are two striking features of the decision. First, assembly and association are 
tied together. Whereas NAACP located association at the “nexus” between speech and 
assembly, the Bates decision emphasizes the latter. In defending the existence of 
association, the Court argues: 
“Like freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peaceable assembly was 
considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation of a 
government based upon the consent of an informed citizenry—a government 
dedicated to the establishment of justice and the preservation of liberty. And it is 
now beyond dispute that freedom of association for the purpose of advancing 
ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.”221 
While the Court mentions speech, it chooses to begin its description of association with 
the right to assemble. Assembly is not mentioned because of its relevance to the case 
itself: the precedence of the holding in NAACP two years earlier places this conflict under 
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the scope of association. Instead, it is mentioned as a means of introducing association, 
demonstrating the close connection between the two.  
The short concurrence by Justice Black and Justice Douglas goes so far as to 
explicitly connect the two. Stressing that First Amendment rights cannot be impaired by 
the government through any form, the concurrence states that, “freedom of assembly, 
includes of course freedom of association; and it is entitled to no less protection than any 
other First Amendment right.”222 In their description, association is wholly derived from 
and dependent on assembly. 
The decision argues that assembly plays a key role in self-governance by creating 
an informed citizenry. Associations of citizens are an important part of achieving this 
end, insofar as free association exists as an extension of assembly because associations 
allow for a more prolonged and intimate exchange of ideas. This connection is important 
to understand why the right of assembly became so neglected by the Supreme Court: 
association was able to cover much of what assembly might have. 
 The second feature is that the Court limits association to its capacity as a forum. It 
is introduced in the decision as the “freedom of association for the purpose of advancing 
ideas and airing grievances.”223 This purpose leaves all forms of association not involving 
speech unprotected. Assembly, as written into the Bill of Rights, is not constrained by 
any purpose. As association comes to replace assembly in US jurisprudence, the right to 
gather is more constrained by the nontextual associational freedom than by First 
Amendment assembly. 
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 Freedom of association became a key tool of the Court to protect the NAACP 
during the Civil Rights Movement. For example, in Shelton v. Tucker (1960), the Court 
struck down an Arkansas statute requiring teachers to reveal all the organizations they 
affiliated with—a law clearly targeted at the NAACP.224 The decision used freedom of 
association to protect the NAACP. But it described it as “a right closely allied to freedom 
of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society,” 
demonstrating the Court’s shift away from assembly.225  
The next year, in Louisiana v. NAACP (1961), the Court struck down two 
Louisiana statutes. The first prohibited interstate business with communist or subversive 
organizations, while the other required membership lists from registered associations. 
The Court ruled that the former was too vague and that the latter too broad, thus violating 
the freedom to associate.226 
These rulings were crucial to the survival of the NAACP. From 1955 to 1957, 
membership of the NAACP in the South had dropped decreased by 50,000 people to 
80,000 total. In Louisiana, it had dropped from 13,000 to just 1,700. The protection and 
privacy afforded by the Court allowed the NAACP to expand without fear of 
retribution.227 
 Association ushered in a new chapter to the conflict between assembly and racial 
equality. Physical assemblies were crucial in the Civil Rights Movement, as were the 
associations that organized them. Protected associations can plan and execute coordinated 
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efforts with much higher effectiveness which was key in fostering social change across 
the United States. At the same time that the Court was striking down the convictions of 
demonstrators without expanding the principle of assembly, they were meaningfully 
developing association to protect the groups organizing the demonstrations.228  
 During this period, a different social movement was having a very disparate 
experience with their associational freedom. As the Cold War intensified, Communist 
organizations and the citizens affiliated with them were denied protection by the Supreme 
Court. In the year after NAACP was decided, the opportunity to apply freedom of 
association to two different cases appeared before the Court. In both cases, the Court held 
in favor of the government, reducing the decision to balancing the interests of each party 
rather than defending the civil liberties of citizens affiliated with Communist 
organizations. 229 
 In Uphaus v. Wyman (1959), a summer camp Executive Director was called to 
testify before a New Hampshire legislative investigating committee for violating the State 
Subversive Activities Act. After refusing to release the names of camp attendees, the 
director was jailed by a state court. 
 In the decision, the Court acknowledges that the camp guests have an “interest” in 
their “associational privacy.”230 They maintain that this interest must be balanced against 
public ones. In doing so, the Court skirts any serious examination of the right to 
association, instead prioritizing state interest of “self-preservation” against 
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communism.231 NAACP is explicitly invoked when the Court concludes that the 
“governmental interest outweighs individual rights in an associational privacy which, 
however real in other circumstances, cf. National Association for Advancement of 
Colored People v. Alabama, supra, were here tenuous, at best.”232 
 Barenblatt v. United States was decided the same year. Instead of the interests of 
a state government, it centered on the conflict between the federal government and 
communism. It also dodged any serious discussion of freedom of association.233 
 The Court held that the conviction of a professor who refused to testify about his 
membership history with the Communist party in front of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities was constitutional. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion. 
Despite its length, the decision lacks any serious analysis of how the inquiries of the 
House Committee hinged on the testimony of a professor’s experiences in graduate 
school. Instead, he holds that it would be too constricting to investigatory processes to 
dismiss the Committee’s inquiry into the professor and concludes, “that the balance 
between the individual and the governmental interests here at stake must be struck in 
favor of the latter.”234  
 Justice Black, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas, wrote a scathing 
dissent in response to the Barenblatt decision. In it, he condemns the Court for the 
vagueness of the balancing test used, arguing that the current system rewrites the First 
Amendment to read:  
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“Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and 
petition, unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that, 
on balance, the interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms is greater 
than the interest of the people in having them exercised.”235 
 The Court continued to hold in favor of the government when it came to the 
Communist party in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) 
(1961) and Scales v. United States (1961).236 While the decisions that backed the NAACP 
were all unanimous, the communist cases split the Court: Justices Stewart, Frankfurter, 
Harlan, Whittaker, and Clark consistently sided with government interests when 
communism was involved. These rulings demonstrate the extent to which anti-communist 
sentiment colored the Court’s willingness to prioritize individual liberties. As the ACLU 
legal director Mel Wulf put it, there were “red cases and black cases.”237 
 This tension came to a head in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation 
Committee (1963). The president of the Miami branch of the NAACP was imprisoned 
after refusing to turn over membership lists to a Florida committee investigating 
communist activity.238 For segregationists, the case was an ideal opportunity to weaken 
the NAACP by forcing the Court to choose between competing interests.239  
After the retirement of Justice Whittaker, the Court was left deadlocked 4-4 over 
the decision. Then, Justice Frankfurter suffered a stroke. The case was reargued for two 
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new Justices, White and Goldberg, the next term. Justice Goldberg provided the vote the 
NAACP needed, solidifying the Court’s commitment to the Civil Rights Movement.240  
 The “constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association and petition” 
are referred to in the decision.241 The exclusion of assembly is a sign of how association 
by 1961 was beginning to entirely obscure the right of assembly. Whereas early cases had 
invoked both assembly and association, later cases began to center solely on association. 
 Only Justice Douglas’s concurrence looks to assembly in deciding the case. He 
elaborates on the importance of association activity under the First Amendment, quoting 
De Jonge to emphasize the right of peaceable assembly as “essential.”242 He argues that 
the ability to freely gather to discuss with fellow citizens is too important for the 
government to impede, no matter their interest. Still, Justice Douglas frames group rights 
as important to free speech, stating that, “Joining a group is often as vital to freedom of 
expression as utterance itself.”243 
 In sum, the Supreme Court formalized freedom of association in 1958 as a means 
to protect the growing Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Before NAACP v. 
Alabama, assembly and association had been largely interchangeable. Associational 
freedom offered a more obvious means by which to protect the NAACP membership lists 
because of the more permanent gatherings that it implied. While decisions after NAACP 
treated association as a right stemming from the assembly right, the Court relied more 
and more on speech to ground association.  
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 In these decisions, the Court continually tied the freedom of association to the 
purpose of expression. In the next section, I will discuss the Court’s ruling in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, which introduced the non-textual right of privacy. These two trends set up 
the Court’s ruling in the 1980s cases Roberts v. United States Jaycees, which officially 
constrain associations to private and expressive ones. As assembly was made irrelevant in 
part by association, the limiting of association to expression would effectively eliminate 
both rights from Supreme Court jurisprudence.   
 
Right to Privacy 
 In 1972, the Court ruled that a married couple’s access to contraception could not 
be limited by governmental legislation because of the right to privacy. The case, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, established privacy as an independent, nontextual right. To do 
so, Griswold relied on the precedence set by the freedom of association. 
  The opinion, written by Justice Douglas, argues that the “association of people is 
not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights,” but “its existence is 
necessary in making the express guarantees [of the First Amendment] fully 
meaningful.”244 In doing so, Justice Douglas diminishes the importance of assembly, 
limiting it only to “the right to attend a meeting.”245 He suggests that the freedom of 
association is what allows people to gather, exchange ideas, and promote change instead. 
This assertion is in contradiction to the treatment of assembly throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries, which elevated assembly as a critical tool in self-governance. Much more than 
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simply protecting meetings, assembly was taken to protect groups that generated 
democratic change. 
 Justice Douglas goes on to argue that the guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
“penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.” He asserts that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments all have 
protections that create spaces of privacy in practice. These zones in combination imply 
the existence of a right to privacy.246 
 When Griswold was decided, it served to strengthen the legitimacy of the freedom 
of association. No longer was association the sole nontextual right relied on by the 
Supreme Court. Over time, however, Griswold changed how privacy was treated by the 
Court in a way that would erode association and assembly. 247 
When the decision was first drafted by Justice Douglas, it argued that a married 
couple’s right of association was violated by the Connecticut law criminalizing 
contraception, much like how the right to send a child to a religious school was 
peripherally protected by association. Privacy was not mentioned until the last 
sentence.248 The problem with this reasoning was that association had been limited to the 
purpose of advocacy in previous opinions. The decisions made between a married couple 
did not serve to advance beliefs or express grievances, leaving it outside the scope of 
what the Court had treated association as covering.249 
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After criticism from Justice Brennan that his construction of association might 
open group protections to the Communist party, Justice Douglas rewrote the opinion. His 
second draft became the Griswold decision, sans two sentences.250  
Prior to Griswold, privacy was primarily invoked by the Supreme Court to protect 
groups with outward-facing actions. For example, in NAACP v. Alabama, the Court is 
concerned with protecting “effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones.”251 The NAACP’s privacy was repeatedly protected by 
the Supreme Court because it is an association that expresses dissident views. 
Griswold introduced a right to privacy that protected intimate, inward-facing 
associations. In Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the Court extended the protections of 
Griswold to single people in search of contraception. Freedom of association was set 
aside entirely, as the Court protected the privacy of individual, autonomous decision-
making.252 This reworked approach to privacy would affect assembly in the landmark 
case Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984). 
 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees and its Impact 
 The United States Jaycees was an all-men's nonprofit organization dedicated to 
promoting and fostering "the growth and development of young men's civic 
organizations."253 When two Minnesota chapters began accepting women into their ranks, 
they were faced with sanctions and other punishments from the national organization. 
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The chapters then sued the Jaycees under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which makes 
discriminatory practices in the enjoyment of public accommodations illegal.254 
The question of whether forcing the inclusion of women violated the Jaycee’s 
freedom of speech and association came before the Supreme Court. In their landmark 
decision, the Court split association into two different forms: intimate association and 
expressive association. Considering each kind in turn, the Court held that neither were 
violated by the Minnesota Human Rights Act.255 
 The decision, written by Justice Brennan, begins with intimate associations. First, 
he asserts that “certain kinds of highly personal relationships” have been protected under 
the Bill of Rights because of the individual liberties it protects.256 While the state may be 
able to regulate who is hired as your coworker, they cannot regulate who you marry. 
These close ties have several benefits: they help people share ideas, they provide 
emotional enrichment, and they ultimately contribute to defining one’s identity, a task 
“central to any concept of liberty.”257  
There is a broad range of relationships between the intimacy of marriage and the 
association of employees. For the sake of Roberts, it is sufficient to show that the Jaycees 
are not an intimate association. Justice Brennan describes the chapters of the Jaycees as 
“large and basically unselective groups,” pointing to their membership numbers and 
acceptance criteria. Thus, they are not an intimate association.258 
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Next, Justice Brennan considers whether the Jaycees could be considered an 
expressive association. He asserts that First Amendment activities that involve 
associating have long been protected for a variety of ends—“political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural.”259 The right to associate does, however, have a 
significant limit: it must on balance be more important than compelling state interests.  
In Jaycee, Justice Brennan weighs the Jaycee male members’ associational 
freedom with Minnesota’s interest in preventing discrimination against women. He finds 
that the scales tip in favor of anti-discrimination; the Jaycee’s claim fails under both 
intimate and expressive associational protections.260 
Roberts marks a significant narrowing in the scope of associational rights. 
Associational rights were established for the purpose of “advancing ideas and airing 
grievances.” While the advent of intimate associations theoretically expands on this 
definition, it leaves the vast majority of associations unprotected—while most intimate 
associations could be adequately protected by the right to privacy. The formal 
establishment of “expressive associations” solidifies the restrictions the Court was 
applying to association as early as NAACP v. Alabama. It formalizes the limitation, 
meaning associations must have a clear expressive purpose beyond just “advancing 
ideas” between each other. Roberts set association on the path to extinction by placing it 
as subordinate to speech and privacy rights. 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor advocated for a different test for 
association. She argues that it is an error to base the constitutional protections for an 
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association on the statements of it or its members. For example, even if the Jaycees had a 
clear anti-women expressive stance, their discriminatory policy still seems unacceptable. 
Instead, she suggests that the Court should distinguish between commercial associations 
and “protected expression” associations. She defines the latter broadly to include “quiet 
persuasion, inculcation of traditional values, instruction of the young, and community 
service.”261 The Jaycees are engaged in sufficiently commercial activities to justify the 
Minnesota government's legitimate interest in regulating their membership.262 
This alternative presents its own problems. Some associations may be commercial 
and expressive. For example, dissident groups may need to expend large amounts of their 
time fundraising to remain viable because of the unpopularity of their expression.263 
The Court ruled on two more gender discrimination cases in the wake of Roberts. 
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte and New York 
State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, the Court held that legislation forcing large local 
clubs to accept women was constitutional. In these cases, freedom of association’s 
connection with speech was used to restrict the right. Associations that failed to be 
expressive enough were denied protection. Before Roberts, the connection between 
association and speech had been used to bolster the right by grounding it beyond 
assembly in the First Amendment.264 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), the Court found a sufficiently 
expressive association. After an assistant scoutmaster was fired for being gay and 
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participating in gay activism, he sued the Boy Scouts of America for discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation.265 
In the opinion, Justice Rehnquist assesses the materials of the Boy Scouts to 
conclude that their general mission is “to instill values in young people.”266 The assistant 
scoutmasters play a key role in the pursuit of this mission because of their time spent with 
the young scouts. Concluding that it is “indisputable that an association that seeks to 
transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity,” the Court finds the Boy 
Scouts of America to be an expressive association.267  
Justice Rehnquist then considers if anti-gay rhetoric is part of the Boy Scout’s 
expressive activity. Pointing to the use of “morally straight” and “clean” in the Scout 
Oath and Law, along with other statements by the organization, Justice Rehnquist 
acquiesces that a gay assistant scoutmaster is sufficiently contrary to the Boy Scout’s 
expressive intent. As such, the forced inclusion of Mr. Dale damages the expressive 
ability of the association, a burden that outweighs the interest of public accommodation 
laws.268 
The dissent written by Justice Stevens highlights the fallibility of the Court’s 
approach to association. To begin, Justice Stevens points out that nowhere in the Scout 
Oath, Scout Law, or Scout Handbook is homosexuality mentioned or condemned. The 
definitions of the terms “clean” and “morally straight” provided by the Boy Scouts bear 
no relation to sexuality, and the handbook advises that “Your parents or guardian or a sex 
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education teacher should give you the fact about sex that you must know.”269 In sum, 
there is no clear expressive goal for or against gay rights in any of the Boy Scout’s 
material, except for one exclusionary policy statement. Though they may be an 
expressive association, they are not an expressive association against homosexuality.270  
Similar to the 1960s communism cases, the cultural attitudes impact the Court’s 
interpretation of expressive activity in Boy Scouts. This bias highlights the problem of 
treated associational and assembly right as purely expressive. When content is the 
primary concern, the basic liberty of gathering falls to the wayside. It can cut both ways: 
content was used to deny communist groups associational rights but maintain the Boy 
Scouts’ right to discriminate. A cohesive approach to association would prevent the same 
manipulation of expression. 
 
The Disappearance of Association 
 After association was explicitly tied to expression in Roberts, the freedom began 
to erode in free speech, much like assembly. 
 The controversy in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston, Inc., centered on the inclusion of different groups during a parade. Parades, a 
celebratory, impermanent gathering of citizens, are a textbook exercise of the right to free 
assembly. The fact that the Hurley decision does not once mention assembly or 
association is emblematic of the degradation of both rights in favor of speech.271 
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 In Hurley, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council did not want to include 
the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group (GLIB) in their Boston St. 
Patrick’s Day parade. When GLIB was denied participation in the parade, they sued the 
veteran’s organization for discrimination. The Court held that forcing the Veterans 
Council to include GLIB would force a private speaker to express content to which it was 
opposed, a violation of their speech rights.272 Rather than focus on the constitutional 
significance of in-person gatherings, the Court reduced the parade to only have 
expressive value. Such a decision neglects the rich and important history that assembly 
has in the United States regardless of its instrumental value to expression. 
In the 2010 decision Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, association was 
collapsed in speech. The Christian Legal Society (CLS) at Hastings Law School required 
all members to adhere to their Statement of Faith and membership requirements—which 
included forbidding homosexuality. The school forced the CLS to have a policy that 
welcomed all new members, no matter their sexual orientation, to receive funding and 
other benefits from the school. The CLS held that this violated their First Amendment 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.273 
Though the CLS presented two different arguments based on their speech and 
associational freedoms, the Court found that the two merged because “Who speaks on 
[the CLS’s] behalf […] colors what concept is conveyed.”274 This assertion demonstrates 
the extent to which association had become defined solely by its expressive content, or 
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“what concept” it conveys. As such, the Court decided to apply their limit-public-forum 
test rather than the strict scrutiny test that would be applied to violations of association. 
Because freedom of association had been morphed into an expressive right, the Court 
could justify collapsing it entirely into freedom of speech. As such, they were able to 
apply a more lenient test.275 
Luke Sheahan argues that there are two ways in which this move by the Court 
erased freedom of association. First, it limited First Amendment rights at a public 
university. Before, universities had historically been treated as protected spaces for 
speech and association. Second, the Court did not apply freedom of association to their 
public forum deliberation. Instead, they consider it in terms of speech rights. This cuts 
association out of an important protection.276 
 
Conclusion 
 In the conclusion of Chapter II, I pointed to several key themes in the history of 
assembly. Because freedom of association largely carried on assembly’s mantle after 
1958, it is worth touching on these themes again. 
 First, there is the question of where group gatherings need to have a purpose to be 
protected. From the case that first formalized it, association was given an explicit purpose 
that assembly was not: the exchange of ideas. This expressive purpose limited the right, 
as was seen in the communism cases and the initial draft of Griswold. When the right was 
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formally limited in Roberts to expression and privacy, it led to the eventual disappearance 
of association entirely.  
When the value of association is set at its expression, something is lost. Groups 
are important beyond the cohesive message they impart because of the role they play in a 
democratic society, as expounded upon by Tocqueville. While expression is part of that, 
it cannot capture all the importance of association. 
 Expression is also liable to limitations that association is not. Limiting or 
protecting an association because of the content they express ignores the fundamental 
right that people have to assemble in the first place. Expressive aims between groups may 
conflict, but the basic assembly rights of those groups should remain the same. Assembly 
and association should be independent of expression to protect dissident groups with 
unpopular expression. 
 In Chapter II, I also discussed the role of assembly in the fight for racial equality. 
Association carried on this fight in the Civil Rights Movement by protecting the NAACP. 
The juxtaposition between Bryant and the Civil Rights cases demonstrates how 
associational freedom can protect dissident groups pursuing racial equality without 
having to extend the same protections to organizations fostering violent activity. 
 In sum, this chapter began with the work of Alexis de Tocqueville on American 
associations. I then considered the cases that came before NAACP v. Alabama. In 
NAACP, the Court formally established the freedom of association but limited it to the 
purpose of exchanging ideas. In the wake of NAACP, civil rights organizations were 
extended associational protections while communist groups were denied. The freedom 
continued to be constrained by an expressive purpose. After Griswold v. Connecticut 
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established the right to privacy, Roberts v. United States Jaycees formally limited 
association freedom to expressive and private organizations. This limitation would come 
to restrict the right of association entirely to speech and privacy, collapsing association 
into the other rights entirely. 
 In the next chapter, I will consider four different scholarly theories on how we 
may reinvigorate the right to assemble and the right to association. I’ll begin with 
Nicholas Brod and Tabatha Abu El-Haj, who focus on protecting in-person gatherings. 
Then, I will consider the work of John Inazu, who argues that assembly can be used to 
protect group autonomy where association has failed. Finally, I summarize Ashutosh 
Bhadwhag’s theory of association speech, which emphasizes the role assembly and 







IV. Modern Theories of Assembly 
  
 Throughout the last two chapters, I have traced the evolution of the right of 
assembly throughout the history of the United States. Assembly began as a robust 
American tradition at the founding, but through time, became restricted by permit 
requirements, public space regulations, and freedom of speech. Freedom of association 
rose to prominence as assembly declined, though the two had historically always been 
connected. As association was collapsed into free speech, the right to assembly was left 
largely unprotected by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 A variety of modern scholars have identified the disappearance of assembly from 
US Supreme Court decisions as concerning. In this chapter, I will consider the theories of 
four of these scholars. These theories share three underlying themes: that the history of 
assembly reveals meaningful principles that have been lost over time, that the current 
Supreme Court expressive requirements are too limiting on group autonomy, and that 
assembly and association are important because of their fundamental contributions to 
self-governance.  
 The first two theories I will consider are concerned with physical gatherings. 
Tabatha Abu El-Haj argues that permit requirements and other regulations on assembly 
are too restrictive given the original understanding of assembly and must be reconsidered. 
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She uses the protests at the 2008 RNC and DNC as examples of assembly restrictions 
being too suffocating.277  
Nicholas Brod argues that assembly needs to be reinvigorated separate from 
association to protect in-person gatherings and suggests that the Court might apply 
means-end scrutiny on assembly instead. He argues that the Occupy movement that 
spread across the country after the financial crisis was precisely the sort of assembly that 
would have been protected in the Founding era but was left in the cold by current court 
doctrine.278  
The next two focus on group autonomy. John Inazu inverts Brod’s argument, 
suggesting that assembly should be used to reinvigorate associational rights. Inazu asserts 
that association has become too constrained in modern jurisprudence. He points to 
pluralism in the 1960s and Rawlsian liberalism in the 1980s as theoretical factors that 
resulted in freedom of association excluding dissident or unpopular groups. Because 
association was limited by expression, it fails to recognize that groups have expressive 
value simply for existing. Instead, Inazu argues that the history of assembly rights is 
sufficient to ground the right as protecting noncommercial, peaceable groups, so long as 
the group does not partake in monopolization.279 
 Ashutosh Bhagwat is also concerned with reinvigorating group rights but 
believes that freedom of association is capable of doing so rather than assembly. He 
argues that assembly and association should be treated as equal to freedom of speech, 
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rather than subordinate. He points out that First Amendment freedoms like petition and 
assembly appeared in British governance earlier than free speech and contribute to the 
democratic process in vital ways. Expanding the conception of self-governance to include 
all First Amendment freedoms offers a means by which to ground association by 
protecting democratic associations rather than expressive ones.280 
 
El-Haj’s Criticism of Permit Requirements and Other Regulations 
In “The Neglected Right of Assembly,” Tabatha Abu El-Haj is critical of the 
normalization of permit requirements and other regulations in order to assemble. She 
contrasts the festive street politics of the late 1700s and early 1800s with the state of 
assembly now.  
El-Haj uses the festive politics in the first hundred years of the United States to 
illustrate how an uninfringed assembly right enriched the civic culture. While I covered 
much of this in Chapter II, it is worth restating here. Elections and national holidays were 
times to march together, eat together, toast together, and celebrate together. Even 
momentous events in foreign affairs like the French Revolution sparked spontaneous 
marches that spread across cities in celebration.281  
El-Haj argues that these events were “infused with political meaning.”282 For 
example, the processions through Boston in 1793 after the Battle of Valmy was 
inherently political given the conflicts over aid to France at the time. That day in Boston 
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saw a series of marches trace their way through the streets, including one led by carts 
loaded with food for a feast at the end. The marches did not have a set of demands or 
petition they submitted to the government. But it served to inform the citizenry, express 
positive attitudes towards France, and build community.283 
Assemblies were also used to push back against political majorities as 
Tocqueville observed. After the passage of the Alien and Sedition acts, Republicans met 
in Maryland "for an open-air celebration, military … maneuvers, and open-air feast."284 
As a rebuke to the Federalist administration, the group toasted Thomas Jefferson and the 
Declaration of Independence.285 This group was allowed to meet, sans permits and 
restrictions, to exchange ideas amongst themselves. They acted as a check on the will of 
the majority.286  
The culture of unrestricted assembly carried into the 19th century. The 1830 
celebration of the French Revolution in Philadelphia had great similarities to the marches 
in Boston 37 years prior. Excepting the Antebellum South, assembly was something that 
could be accessed no matter race, class, or gender. For example, Black communities 
organized annual celebrations of the slave trade abolition that included parades in New 
York and Philadelphia.287 
When it came to regulating assembly, the traditional framework dictated that "[i]t 
is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public 
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disturbances, or operate as nuisances, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible 
public or private mischief, that the law interferes.”288 This approach is in sharp contrast to 
the limitations on assemblies in the modern-day. Not only is it incredibly arduous to 
organize a march or demonstration, as I will describe below, but the expressive value of 
assemblies is now scrutinized in deciding how they are afforded protections. The 
traditional approach allows dissident groups to assemble freely, regardless of how the 
government feels about their ideology—like communist organizations. Gatherings cannot 
be problematic for contradictory viewpoints until they start causing violence. Content-
based restrictions on assembly are trickier. 
Having described the salience of assembly in Founding-Era life, I will now 
summarize El-Haj’s assessment of contemporary street regulations. In 2009, twenty 
American cities had “extensive permit requirements for gatherings on public streets.”289 
Most public parks had similar requirements. In these cities, applying for a permit 
involved providing a range of information, from the personal details of the organizer to 
the timing, purpose, and attendee numbers of the event. Some permits were time-
sensitive—a permit for a parade in Chicago had to be submitted at least fifteen business 
days before the event.290 
Many permits still have conditions attached once they are issued. Officials may 
reroute parades if they are taking an inconvenient route. Sometimes, the action may be 
more drastic. El-Haj points to the New York City protests against the Iraq War in 2003, 
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where a march was moved a distance away from the United Nations and forced to be 
stationary. The provided reasoning for this decision was that the proposed demonstration 
“[did] not have the discipline of an organized line or march where there is an established, 
carefully planned and paced sequence throughout the parade route.”291 
Sometimes, regulations are temporarily issued in anticipation of controversial 
events. At the 2008 Republican National Convention, St. Paul created a security zone that 
banned assemblies near the convention center. Protests were only allowed in the free 
speech zone 80 feet away from the RNC. That same year, Denver created a 
demonstration zone two football fields away from the Democratic National Convention 
Center. Permits to hold demonstrations in these zones had to be requested months in 
advance. 292 
In the modern-day, these restrictions are widely accepted in constitutional law as 
time, place, and manner regulations on public forum use. The public forum doctrine 
established in Hague v. CIO has evolved to include such restrictions on expressions, so 
long as they serve a significant government interest. These interests can be "[m]aintaining 
order, preventing traffic jams, and ensuring security.”293  
Hague was widely seen as expanding freedom of assembly because struck the 
standard set in Davis v. Massachusetts that public spaces were under the total control of 
the legislatures. However, it still held that assembly in public spaces “must be exercised 
in subordination to the general comfort and convenience.”294 This is already a narrower 
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standard than the traditional one because it places assembly at a lower priority than 
“convenience.” In contrast, assemblies in the Founding era could be inconvenient, so 
long as they were not violent or disruptive. 
Cox v. New Hampshire, which came just two years, illustrates the ramifications of 
this change. In. Cox, the Court held that regulations of parades on public streets to 
“assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways” can take 
preference to free assembly.295 The use of "convenience" in both decisions demonstrates 
that how assemblies had become inferior to the comfort of the population at large. 
Changes like this disadvantage minority group's ability to influence the government.296 
This treatment of assembly is a sharp divergence from how gatherings were 
treated at the turn of the 19th century. In that period, assemblies were permitted to gather 
freely in the streets until they became violent. Now, assemblies must obtain permits, 
provide all relevant information, remain non-disruptive, and still may be faced with 
regulations—something like disrupting traffic may now be considered a violation of the 
peace.297 
El-Haj argues that we should be concerned about the intense government 
regulation currently surrounding assembly. As the evolution of the right reveals, it: 
“is meant foremost to protect an avenue of democratic politics. It protects both the 
people’s ability to influence and check government and a space for the formation, 
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reconsideration, and consolidation of political preferences and, by implication, for 
the formation of an autonomous people.”298 
Assembly is valuable in and of itself because of its role in self-governance—a value that 
extends beyond what assembly contributes to speech. Regulations like those at the 2008 
RNC and DNC separate protesters from those they are protesting. Such restrictions 
prevent assemblies from performing their full duty in a democratic society.  
 El-Haj concludes her argument by warning that the right to assembly “should not 
be collapsed into the right of free expression.”299 The power of collective action is unique 
to assembly and thus, regulations on group activity should be subject to higher 
scrutiny.300  
 While El-Haj makes a convincing point in juxtaposing assemblies in the past and 
present-day, her theory does have limitations. She does not present a substantive test by 
which to determine constitutionally suffocating regulations. Her main focus is identifying 
the problem—though this is certainly a valuable contribution in and of itself.  
Returning the standard for assembly to the traditional one of the Founding era 
poses problems. Technology has advanced in ways that make a rowdy assembly even 
more dangerous than it once was—the January 6th insurrection that I discuss in the next 
chapter is a painful illustration of this. Cars and motorcycles also make public forums 
like streets more dangerous than they once were. Finding a way to reinvigorate assembly 
while still protecting public safety is not impossible, but it will take further analysis to 
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determine which regulations should go. Some might be obvious, like her condemnation 
of the free speech zones at the convention, but others require more consideration. 
 
Brod’s Assembly as Physical Gatherings 
 In “Rethinking a Reinvigorated Right to Assemble,” Nicholas S. Brod is similarly 
concerned about protections for in-person gatherings. He argues that the Court needs to 
revive the right to assemble, independent of association, to protect non-expressive, 
physical gatherings. He uses the Occupy movement, which stemmed from 2011 and 
2012, as an example of demonstrations that would have been protected as lawful 
assembly two centuries earlier.301  
Brod contends that the Occupy movement shares key similarities with Founding 
era gatherings. However, associational rights as they exist today are incapable of 
protecting such demonstrations. Associational rights after Roberts came to depend on the 
expressiveness and intimacy of an organization.302 The Occupy movement was neither—
Brod describes it as “a heterogeneous group that lacked a formalized set of goals, criteria 
for membership, or a leadership class.”303 While they advocated for social change and 
economic reform, they did not have a cohesive expression or a formalized list of 
demands. They also were not intimate: the movement was large and open to anyone.304 
Brod looks to the colonial era to defend his claims and examine how the 
Founder’s would have understood assembly. First, he points out that assembly in the 
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Founding Era was defined as, “[t]o meet together,” “to flock together,” and “to convene, 
as a number of individuals.”305 In other words, “assembly” implied flesh-and-blood 
gatherings. Second, debates from the First Congress suggest that assembly was 
understood to protect dissenting groups congregating in person. This intent is illustrated 
by Representative John Page’s invocation of the trial of Willian Penn during the 
debates.306 Third, over a third of state constitutions at the time included protections for 
assembly.307 Fourth, assemblies played a key role in the daily lives of colonists, from 
parades to taverns. Though I have already covered some of this history in Chapter II and 
above, it’s worth reiterating the historical examples Brod chose to highlight.  
Public streets were a gathering place of special importance. Demonstrations 
against England often occurred there, in which marchers, “chanted, sang, and burned 
objects in effigy.”308 These were often spontaneous, though rarely violent, and allowed 
disadvantaged groups like women and free Black people to participate politically. 
Assembly was crucial to one of the most famous events of the revolution—the Boston 
Tea Party.309 
Taverns were also a very important part of assembly. Brod describes them as 
“quasi-public” spaces, in which colonists could plan, exchange ideas, and discuss 
politics. They were also largely inclusive spaces, as class did not determine who could 
frequent a tavern.310 
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There are three key traits that the Occupy movement shared with colonial 
demonstrations. First, they utilized public spaces. Occupy set up encampments across the 
United States, while colonialists were free to use the streets to demonstrate. Second, they 
employed similar, attention-grabbing tactics. Like colonists dumping tea into the Boston 
Harbor, Occupy used expression conduct in their protests. Third, both called for “a 
thorough rethinking of the political order.”311 The fundamental purpose of assembly is to 
promote self-governance. The colonists used it to fight for a new system of government. 
The Occupy movement did the same in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, reflecting 
the sentiment that “ordinary politics had failed.”312 
Brod ends by sketching out the contours of a potential theory of assembly. First, 
he asserts that the Court should eliminate expression requirements on assemblies. 
Assembly is a form of conduct, and the Court currently only recognizes some forms of 
conduct as expressive. The conduct itself must intend, “to convey a particularized 
message” that would have a high likelihood of being “understood by those who view 
it.”313 Assembly that meets this standard is protected under strict scrutiny, meaning that 
laws that impede it must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest [and] narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end.”314 Conduct that is not expressive is only protected by 
intermediate scrutiny. This test requires that content-neutral regulations be, "'narrowly 
drawn to further a substantial government interest' and to 'preserve […] ample alternative 
channels of communication.'"315 
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Brod argues that the intermediate standard is too feeble in practice. It does not 
require that a law uses the least restrictive means, which means nonexpressive assemblies 
may be impeded by the government even when there are other options available. Even 
more problematic, “amble alternative channels of communication” allows for speech to 
be substituted for action. An inconvenient assembly could make the same point in an op-
ed, but that misses the value of the gathering itself.316  
Second, Brod contends that judges should use a means-end scrutiny in relevant 
cases. This test could look like a significantly modified version of the Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence but would require “special vigilance” in distinguishing “facially content-
neutral laws that are nonetheless applied in content-based ways.”317 For example, the 
neutral time, place, and manner restrictions usually applied to free expression in public 
forums could not account for the nature of the Occupy movement. Its disruptive timing, 
placement, and manner were part of its message because it is conduct, not speech. But 
courts continually ruled in favor of local regulations that shut down these camps, ending 
the assembly.318 
Third, when intermediate-scrutiny is applied, it should be done so in a way 
mindful of accessibility in the treatment of assembly rights. Assembly in inconvenient 
spaces may be the best option for those who lack access to the forums utilized by 
wealthier and better-connected people like the internet.319 This dichotomy was 
recognized in Justice Marshall’s dissent in Clark v. Commun. For Nonviolence, in which 
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he remarked: “[J]udicial administration of the First Amendment, in conjunction with a 
social order marked by large disparities in wealth and other sources of power, tends 
systematically to discriminate against efforts by the relatively disadvantaged to convey 
their political ideas.”320 
 To conclude, Brod argues that freedom of assembly offers a unique way to 
protect property rights under the First Amendment. Taken as a positive right, peaceable 
assembly could oblige the government to created areas free of traditional public-forum 
constraints.321 
While the main concerns of Brod and El-Haj's theories differ, what they share 
thematically is mutualistic. El-Haj offers a detailed examination of how assemblies once 
freely contributed to the democratic process, emphasizing its importance, and Brod 
introduces a new framework to approach assembly jurisprudence. While his theory is 
promising, it leaves freedom of association untouched, despite its degradation over the 
last 40 years. Assembly was considered the same as association for a significant enough 
time in the US, including the colonial period that Brod grounds his argument in, that to 
fully reinvigorate the right of assembly demands attention to association as well. The next 
two theories offer perspectives on this. 
 
John Inazu’s Assembly as Protecting Group Autonomy 
 John Inazu takes the opposite approach to Brod, arguing that assembly can and 
should be expanded to protected group autonomy. As I discussed in Chapter III, requiring 
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that associations are expressive to receive legal protection fails to acknowledge the 
importance of group dynamics. Inazu argues that this is because “something important is 
lost when we fail to grasp the connection between a group’s formation, composition, and 
existence and its expression.”322 He uses “a gay social club, a prayer or meditation group, 
and a college fraternity” as examples of associations that are not protected under current 
constitutional doctrine but still convey a message simply by existing.323 The rituals and 
gatherings of these groups all express something—even if the groups do not have a clear 
doctrine— each which conflicts to some degree with social norms.324 Like Brod and El-
Haj, Inazu grounds the importance of reviving assembly in the work that it does to further 
the democratic process. 
 Even when groups are afforded an expressive status, they are still given few 
protections when it comes to anti-discrimination. Inazu points to a recent Ninth Circuit 
ruling that held that a high school Bible club could not limit their membership to 
Christians as evidence for this degradation. Deciding on who can be part of a group is 
essential to group autonomy, and current Court doctrine fails to account for this.325 
 Inazu argues that the right to assemble should be used by the Court to reinvigorate 
protections for group associations, using the history of assembly to back this claim. There 
are four principles at play in its past that make it applicable. 
 First, Inazu argues that historically “assembly extends not only to groups that 
further the common good but also to dissident groups that act against the common 
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good.”326 This can be seen in comparing the text of state constitutions with the First 
Amendment at the time of its passage. While “common good” clauses were used in state 
constitutions, there is no qualifier on assembly in the US Constitution.327 In practice, this 
meant that assemblies could not be persecuted for their content so long as their conduct 
was peaceful. For example, Henry Bridges was not deported despite his participation in 
activities of the Communist Party because he never advocated for violence.328 
Next, he asserts that “this right extends to a vast array of religious and social 
groups.”329 The labor movement, Suffragettes, and those fighting for racial equality all 
used assembly to protect their associations, demonstrations, and marches in pursuit of 
democratic change. Religious groups also historically enjoyed assembly protections. The 
paradigmatic British assembly case—the trial of William Penn—centered on protecting 
assemblies engaging in religious activity. There were also several cases decided before 
the Civil War that protected the right of religious groups to exclude, like Leavitt v. Truair 
and First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns.330  
His third point is that “just as the freedom of speech guards against restrictions 
imposed prior to an act of speaking, assembly guards against restrictions imposed prior to 
an act of assembling—it protects a group’s autonomy, composition, and existence.”331 
This can be seen in the minimal regulation on assembly in the Founding era. Permission 
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did not need to be given to gather, so long as a group did so peaceably. Modern 
requirements subvert this history standard. 
Finally, he asserts that “assembly is a form of expression—the existence of a 
group and its selection of members and leaders convey a message.”332 A great example of 
this was the Democratic-Republican societies that formed to criticize Federalist 
administrations. Whether or not the group was publishing a formalized set of demands, 
their existence still acted as a rebuttal to the political majority. The meetings of the 
societies conveyed a message that the power of the Federalists was not total. There were 
alternatives, as embodied by the people in the organization. The societies made an effort 
to involve women and Black citizens to illustrate their egalitarian values. In this fashion, 
the identities of the members and leaders mattered toward the message ultimately 
conveyed by the group.333  
 A central tenet to Inazu’s argument is that association cannot do the legwork that 
is needed to revive assembly. Instead, the Court can revive assembly without having to 
rework their current doctrine around expressive association. He blames this current 
doctrine in part on the prevalence of pluralist assumptions in the 1950s and of Rawlsian 
liberalism at the time of Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 334 
Pluralism was championed by David Truman and Robert Dahl after World War 
II, though it was a tradition that had existed since the early 20th century. It grounded the 
success of democratic government in the consensus of groups in society, rather than in 
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the state like German idealism. In Dahl’s theory, society is comprised of “[m]ultiple 
centers of power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign.”335 Majorities are 
achieved through compromises between these groups, which moderates the outcome. 
Combined with an assumption of shared democratic ideals, very little room is left for 
dissenting groups or organizations opposed to the common good. 
 The rise of pluralism had two impacts on freedom of association. First, it placed 
the value of groups in the United States on “the extent that they reinforced and 
guaranteed democratic premises.”336 This perspective explains in part why communist 
organizations were left so unprotected by the Court. Because communist ideology 
operated against the US capitalist system, their rights as a group were rejected. The 
second effect was that groups who did fit the theory were given an incredibly positive 
gloss.337   
 In 1971, John Rawl’s Theory of Justice reinvigorated the field of political theory. 
His theory echoed parts of the pluralism of a decade earlier, despite differences in 
approach. Consensus and stability were key premises: he believed that an overlapping 
consensus about justice could be discovered from a diversity of reasonable doctrines 
constrained by public reason and result in a stable, prosperous society. He included 
freedom of association as a basic liberty, but it was constrained by public reason.338 
Unlike de Tocqueville, Rawls “never really recognized the value of protecting 
antimajoritarian groups on nonideological grounds.”339 
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 Rawlsian liberalism was widely adopted by scholars at the time. Though it was 
never cited by the Court in their landmark association cases, it was used by academics “to 
provide intellectual cover to the Warren Court’s decisions,” especially in creating 
nontextual rights.340  
 These theories illustrate the weaknesses Inazu identifies in current Supreme Court 
doctrine. He believes that dissident and unpopular groups are just as deserving of group 
freedoms as any other organization. The democratic value is not added by what the group 
says, but by their existence. The presence of a group can often hold great expressive 
value, regardless of its stated goals, even if the Court does not recognize it as such. With 
this in mind, Inazu’s suggested meaning of assembly is as follows:  
“The right of assembly is a presumptive right of individuals to form and 
participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups. This right is rebuttable when 
there is a compelling reason for thinking that the justifications for protecting 
assembly do not apply (as when the group prospers under monopolistic or near-
monopolistic conditions).”341 
The use of "peaceable" in the definition allows for legislation that furthers a state's 
compelling interest in peace—like preventing riots or anarchy by a group. 
"Noncommercial" prevents discriminatory hiring practices and other forms of 
discrimination in the economic sector. Under Inazo’s understanding, neither the Boy 
Scouts nor the United States Jaycees would qualify as commercial groups. The caveat in 
the second sentence is intended as a protection against discrimination. If the Boy Scouts 
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could be proven to be a monopolistic organization in their field, then they could not hold 
the same discriminatory policies.342 
 Inazu’s approach is not without its weaknesses. Richard A. Epstein points out two 
in his review of Inazu’s work. First, Epstein argues that the “peaceably” qualifier on 
assembly is too indicative of a physical gathering to truly expand the right to association. 
I do not think this is an unavoidable problem for Inazu. The history of assembly as 
association is rich that the qualifier could be feasibly understood to require non-violent 
actions from an association.343  
Epstein’s second criticism is more salient. He is concerned with Inazu’s approach 
to anti-discrimination concerns. Inazu is very clear to reject an approach centered on 
"logic of congruence" between state and private discrimination standards because they 
would subsequently prevent the formation of exclusive groups for people of color, 
women, and so on. However, his theory as it stands does not provide a good test for when 
anti-discrimination should trump association in non-monopolistic, noncommercial 
groups. Though he wants to argue that race should be treated differently, his failure to 
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Ashutosh Bhagwat’s Associational Speech 
 The final theory I will consider in this chapter is not an assembly theory. Rather, 
Ashutosh Bhagwat argues for a reinvigorated conception of association in his paper 
“Associational Speech.” To do so, Bhagwat illustrates the close connection between 
assembly and association. Though the Court has often tied association to speech, 
Bhagwat argues that assembly and association were historically treated as coequal, 
independent rights. By treating association as subordinate to speech, the Court fails to 
uphold the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment: self-governance.345 
 Bhagwat defends his theory by pointing to the different meanings of assembly and 
association. He traces the two rights as they were employed by the Supreme Court from 
Whitney v. California and De Jonge v. Oregon to the advent of association in NAACP.  
He identifies Whitney as the beginning of the explicit connection between 
assembly and associational rights. Even though the Court focused on Whitney's freedom 
of speech, the case was fundamentally about her association with the Communist party. 
Bhagwat identifies two key takeaways from the decision: first, assembly, association, and 
speech were treated as coequal and separate by the 1927 Court. Second, assembly and 
association were still being treated as largely interchangeable. Though Justice Brandeis 
only refers to assembly in his concurrence, his usage implicates association as well.346 
 In De Jonge, the Court continued to treat assembly and association as the same 
thing. The conflict centered on Mr. De Jonge’s participation in a meeting of the 
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Communist Party, something that is more similar definitionally to association, but the 
Court struck down De Jonge’s conviction because of his right to free assembly.347 
Bhagwat argues that after the NAACP decision, “membership in organizations 
was protected no longer as an independent political freedom but as an aspect of free 
speech.”348 He is critical of the decision because it treats the freedoms of association and 
assembly as valuable because of what they contribute to freedom of speech. They are 
referred to as secondary rights, both employed for the purpose of expressive activity. 
After this case, the Court continued to use freedom of association to protect the 
NAACP.349  
Bhagwat suggests that the Court grounded association in speech out of concern 
that its long history with assembly which be insufficient to justify the formation of the 
nontextual right. But the history between assembly and association operating in the 
interest of democratic governance is substantial enough that such a move was 
unnecessary.350  
Roberts v. United States Jaycees established the modern standard for freedom of 
association. The opinion argued that there are two protected forms of associations: 
expressive ones and intimate ones. The Court held that the Jaycees were neither intimate 
nor expressive enough to justify their discriminatory membership standard, which 
excluded women. In the subsequent decisions Board of Directors of Rotary International 
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v. Rotary Club of Duarte and New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, the Court 
used the same standard to force two more organizations to accept women.351 
Bhagwat points out that Roberts marks a shift in how the expression standards 
were used by the Court. After NAACP, the expression produced by an association was 
used as a reason to protect its rights. In contrast, after Roberts, expression was a means 
by which to limit associational freedoms in the interest of anti-discrimination.352 This 
transition illustrates the dangers of making group rights subsidiaries of free speech: new 
limitations appear that would be irrelevant if the rights were treated as independent. 
 Bhagwat asserts that the importance of assembly and association in democratic 
government has been made clear throughout history. He argues that the colonists, “[t]he 
generation that drafted the First Amendment had lived through the Revolutionary era and 
surely understood the importance of association and assembly in creating a popular 
revolution.”353 Those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War were 
also intimately aware of the importance of First Amendment freedoms towards the 
political and economic empowerment of US citizens. Finally, he points to Tocqueville’s 
theory of association, which prizes the freedom of association both for its role in resisting 
majoritarian rule and its contribution to developing the skills and values necessary for 
collective rule.354 
 With this history established, Bhagwat turns to locating association in First 
Amendment theories. He focuses on the theory that the value of free speech comes from 
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its role in self-governance. This approach originated in Justice Brandeis’s Whitney 
concurrence but has been repeated by scholars like Alexander Meiklejohn, Robert Bork, 
and Cass Sunstein.355  
 Bhagwat argues that the theory of self-governance should be expanded to apply to 
all First Amendment freedoms. Speech alone is insufficient to capture all forms of 
participation. Indeed, the right to petition the government originated in British 
governance long before free speech. Instead, speech, press, assembly, and petition should 
all be treated as “independent provisions, protecting distinct human activities but serving 
the common political and structural goal of enabling meaningful self-governance by the 
sovereign People.”356 No right is subordinate to another, but all rights must be used 
together to be effective. 
 Current Court doctrine largely views self-governance as being limited to voting 
rights. Speech generates thoughtful voting and association allows that speech to be heard. 
The reality of self-governance is much messier; Bhagwat points to modern cable news, 
the attacks on the Adams Administration that resulted in the Sedition Act, and opposition 
to President Lincoln as examples. Aside from the contentious debates, group organization 
is also essential to petitioning the government. Privately, associations are important in the 
pursuit of self-governance because they allow for personal development and education.357 
 The theory of self-governance does not leave freedom of association without 
checks. Instead of protecting expressive associations, Bhagwat concludes that the Court 
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should protect associations “whose primary goals are relevant to the democratic process,” 
though he defined the relevancy broadly.358 Bhagwat uses the Sierra Club as an example 
of an association that is not purely democratic but would still be protected. The Sierra 
Club dedicates tremendous time to lobbying and publicity campaigns. It also organizes 
hikes, clean-up days, and other activities which are not explicitly political but still 
contribute to their end goal. Such peripheral activities would still be protected.359  
 Bhagwat’s theory leaves less room for dissident groups than those espoused by 
Brod and Inazu. A group like the Communist party, which is anti-democratic, may be left 
unprotected by Bhagwat’s approach to associational rights. Inazu argues that the 
expressive value of a group comes from its existence, where Bhagwat suggests that it 
comes from the group’s purpose. Thus, Bhagwat would not have a problem with the 
pluralism or liberalism that Inazu criticizes.  
 Bhagwat’s theory does function well in combination with El-Haj or Brod. His 
conclusion emphasizes the importance of treating every First Amendment right as 
independent and necessary. While his main focus is reworking association so that it may 
better serve the purpose of self-governance, presumably doing the same for assembly is a 
crucial next step in his theory. Both El-Haj and Brod center their concerns on assembly 
and how it contributes to a democratic government. El-Haj’s analysis of politically 
infused assemblies from the Founding fits in especially well alongside Bhagwat’s interest 
in democratic association.  
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Conclusion 
 There are four theories I reviewed in this chapter. First, I began with Tabatha Abu 
El-Haj’s argument that modern permit requirements are antithetical to the treatment of 
assembly in the Founding era and must be rolled back.360  
Next, I focused on Nicholas S. Brod, who condemns efforts to combine freedom 
of association and assembly. Instead, he advocates for a reinvigoration of the right to 
assemble as it protects in-person gatherings, an approach the respects the importance of 
time and place in exercising assembly.361  
 Third, I summarized John Inazu’s argument for expanding assembly rights to 
include group autonomy. Inazu highlights how freedom of association has failed dissident 
groups and suggests that assembly should protect noncommercial, peaceably groups 
because their democratic expression stems from their existence.362 
 Finally, I presented Ashutosh Bhagwat’s defense of association. Bhagwat seeks to 
revitalize all First Amendment rights under the self-governance theory, rather than 
depend mainly on freedom of speech, as the Court does now. With this approach, he 
argues that freedom of association should protect democratic groups, rather than 
expressive ones.363 
 Each of these theories has strengths and weaknesses, depending on what someone 
aims to achieve in reinvigorating assembly. The important thing is that each seeks to 
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separate speech from group freedoms, and each emphasizes the role that groups play in 
the democratic process, by organizing and expressing different opinions.  
 In the next chapter, I will catalog the events of 2020 that highlighted the 
importance of a strong right to assemble in the US. I argue that these events should serve 
as inciting incidents for the Court to reexamine their current treatment of assembly and 
association. These four theories each provide convincing arguments about the neglect of 






V. Assembly in 2020 
 
 In Chapter II, I reviewed the history of the right to assemble. What began as a 
robust right, one used by Americans from all walks of life, in celebrations, political 
debates, and beyond, transformed into a right entirely limited to its expressive value. In 
Chapter III, I picked up where assembly was largely left off: with the right of association. 
Associational freedom offered important protections during the Civil Rights Movement 
but eventually, the right was subsumed into its expressive purpose as well. In Chapter IV, 
I grounded the importance of this history in four modern theories dealing with group 
rights: three focused on assembly, while one focused on association.  
 Two key observations tied these chapters together. First, the importance of 
assembly has repeatedly been connected back to its role in self-governance. The history 
of the right illustrates how it has fulfilled this role in the United States. Second, there is 
an inescapable tension between the importance of group action in democracy and the 
danger that an organized group can pose. Drawing lines to limit groups that engage in 
violent action or discrimination may be easier said than done because it runs the risk of 
leaving other non-objectionable groups without constitutional protection.  
 Both of these themes connect to the recent events in the United States that brought 
freedom of assembly to the forefront of public consciousness. I will focus on four 
different categories to discuss these developments. I will begin with the protests in 
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response to police brutality that broke out internationally beginning in May 2020, largely 
driven by the Black Lives Matter movement.364 These protests formed a new chapter in 
the complicated history between racial equality and assembly since the founding of the 
United States. The violence that the protesters faced in response to their work is an 
alarming look into the state of assembly rights in the United States today.365  
In contrast, some of the protests became violent themselves, posing questions 
about how far assembly rights should extend. Past Supreme Court cases involving the 
KKK and NAACP offer a lens through which to consider what protections should be 
given to violent assemblies. 
 In the second section, I explore the one case involving violent assembly, permit 
requirements, and Black Lives Matter that has already made it to the Supreme Court. In 
DeRay McKesson v. John Doe, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a Fifth Circuit 
court decision that made a protest organizer liable for injuries sustained by a police 
officer—even though the injuries were caused by a different protester. Rather than using 
the case for a meaningful exploration of First Amendment rights, the Court directed the 
Fifth Circuit back to the Louisiana Supreme Court to clarify the meaning of state law.366  
 The Fifth Circuit decision sets the precedent for a guilt-by-association standard 
being applied to protest organizers. I compare this with the decision made in Whitney v. 
California to warn about the dangers of such a doctrine.  
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Then, I consider the Supreme Court’s decision. The choice to not include a 
principled exploration of assembly is somewhat reminiscent of the decisions handed 
down by the Court during the Civil Rights Movement. It shows that the Court is 
continuing its pattern of not seriously addressing assembly rights no matter how salient 
the case. 
 My next section will explore the implications the January 6th insurrection at the 
Capitol has for freedom of association.367 The riot at the Capitol demonstrates the tension 
already brewing during the Black Lives Matter movement over summer: how can the 
right to assemble be meaningfully protected but subsequent violence avoided? Which 
interest should be given higher priority? It also highlights how white privilege protects 
white citizen's ability to engage in constitutionally protected assembly to a much greater 
degree than Black citizens. 
 Tocqueville's theory of association in the United States is disrupted by the 
existence of alt-right groups. Their extreme tactics and antipodal beliefs make them the 
sorts of associations Tocqueville argued were dangerous in European states. The theories 
of Ashutosh Bhagwat and John Inazu offer two different approaches to protecting such 
dissident groups. The former would object to their anti-democratic nature, while the latter 
would want to protect them precisely for their alternate views.  
 While the Court has refrained from seriously considering these questions about 
assembly in the modern-day, state legislatures have given their answers. These laws are 
what I focus on in my fourth and final section. Tracking by the International Center for 
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Not-for-Profit Law found that in the United States, more than double the average number 
of anti-protest bills have been introduced during the 2021 legislative session. These bills 
have serious consequences—in Oklahoma, one was introduced that would absolve 
drivers who run over protesters of guilt.368 
 In this section, I argue that these anti-protest bills are largely unjustifiable. The 
extent to which the bills aim to stifle assembly is unacceptable given the important role 
assembly plays in self-government. They are a different kind of time, place, and manner 
restriction. Some also implicate guilt-by-association. I use the history of assembly and 
Nicholas S. Brod’s theory of assembly to emphasize that legislation endangering 
protesters on public streets is antithetical to the self-governing purpose of assembly. 
 To conclude, I argue that these events highlight the necessity of a clear Supreme 
Court assembly doctrine. The events of 2020 and 2021 demonstrate not just the 
importance of the right to assembly and the rising imperative on the Court to protect the 
rights of protesters and association, but also the danger that groups can pose. Coming up 
with a clear standard can temper both the abuse on and of assembly. 
 
The Rise of the Black Lives Matter Movement 
 On May 25th, 2020, a forty-six-year-old Black man named George Floyd was 
murdered in Minneapolis. A police officer was recorded kneeling on his neck for eight 
minutes while Floyd pleaded for him to stop. The video of his murder incited outrage 
across the nation. Within two days, protests against police brutality and racial inequality 
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began in cities and towns everywhere.369 The protests peaked on June 6th, as half a 
million people gathered in 550 different places in support of the movement. For 
comparison, attendance at the Civil Rights marches in the 1960s only numbered in the 
hundreds of thousands.370 
 I will focus on two protests emblematic of the assembly issues presented by the 
movement: the June 1st protest in Lafayette Square in Washington DC and the 100 nights 
of protest in Portland, Oregon, several of which were declared riots. 
 On June 1st, a group assembled in Lafayette Square across from the White House 
to protest police brutality. The gathering was peaceful. Despite this, about thirty minutes 
before DC's curfew was set to begin at 7:00pm, the National Guard surrounded the 
crowd. Then, the federal troops moved in. Flashbangs, rubber bullets, and tear gas were 
used from the middle of the crowd to clear the assembly. 371 Journalists were among those 
assaulted, indiscriminately subjected to the brutal means of disbursement.372  
 While the troops were moving in on the peaceful protesters, President Trump was 
giving an address in the Rose Garden. In the address, he announced, “Our 7 o’clock 
curfew will be strictly enforced. Those who threaten innocent life and property will be 
arrested, detained, and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.”373 Minutes after it was 
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forcefully cleared, President Trump and a collection of his top advisors walked through 
Lafayette Square to reach St. John’s church for a photo-op.374 
 The treatment of protestors in Lafayette Square is emblematic of the constraints 
placed on assembly during the Black Lives Matter movement at large. First, and most 
obviously, law enforcement used disproportionately violent means to respond to 
protesters. Data from Bellingcat and Forensic Architecture and analyzed by The Guardian 
identified over 950 instances of police brutality against civilians and journalists between 
May and October 2020.375 Between just May 26th and June 2nd, 148 attacks or arrests on 
journalists were recorded.376  
Similarly, ProPublica surveyed 400 videos of police interactions with protesters 
from across the country and found that 184 of them contained “troubling conduct” on the 
part of law enforcement.377 Eighty-seven videos showed officers hitting and kicking 
retreating protesters, 59 involved improper use of pepper spray and tear gas, and 12 
showed officers using batons against noncombative protestors.378 
 Conduct like this serves to discourage assemblies, as it makes people fear for their 
health and wellbeing should they be caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. Even 
nonlethal means like pepper spray or rubber bullets can cause lifelong injuries.379 This 
damages freedom of assembly even if it does not place explicit legal constraints on it. 
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 The treatment of journalists also connects back to Ashutosh Bhagwat’s theory of 
self-governance and First Amendment rights.380 Freedom of the press, freedom of 
assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of petition are all necessary in combination 
with each other for true self-governance. By indiscriminately assaulting the press and 
normal citizens, law enforcement is assaulting both the free press and assembly. It is a 
two-tiered attack on democratic government. 
 The second kind of limit confronted by protesters was regulatory. Curfews, permit 
requirements, and other kinds of regulations seek to limit where, when, and how 
assemblies take place. They were implemented across the country during the Black Lives 
Matter movement. For example, New York City instituted an 8:00pm curfew in early 
June. In one instance, officers boxed in protesters before the curfew officially began, and 
then drove bikes into the crowd once 8:00pm arrived to arrest protesters for curfew 
violations.381 
Tabatha Abu El-Haj was worried that restrictions on assemblies might be too 
suffocating in the modern day to allow for real democratic impact.382 The curfew 
requirements from the summer of 2020 demonstrate the salience of this concern. The 
temporary restrictions were used to place extraordinary limits on assembly that were 
easily exploited by law enforcement.  
The restrictions on assembly not only prevented protesters from staying for as 
long as they wanted but also prevented them from being where they wanted to be. El-Haj 
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criticizes the free speech zones implemented for the 2008 DNC and RNC because they 
placed assemblies too far from the convention centers.383 The protesters in Lafayette 
Square were there to send a clear message to President Trump. When the National Guard 
forcibly ended the assembly, they did it so that the President of the United State could 
walk through the Square unimpeded.384 For assembly to act as a meaningful check on the 
government, those who participate in assemblies must have their concerns heard by those 
in power. The time and place restrictions placed on assemblies across the country 
prevented this from happening. 
The Black Lives Matter protests in Portland showcase two extremes. On one 
hand, some protesters engaged in violent activities that constituted unlawful assembly. 
On the other hand, law enforcement used tactics to discourage protesting that were a 
blatant violation of freedom of assembly.  
 The protests in Portland were largely peaceful.385 Beginning in late May, 
protesters came out for over 100 nights in a row in support of Black Lives Matter. During 
this time, there were outbreaks of violence at certain protests that resulted in injured law 
enforcement officers and serious property damage.386 However, the most destructive 
clashes between law enforcement and protesters began after President Trump sent federal 
troops to Portland to protect federal property.387  
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On July 22nd, the U.S. attorney in Oregon reported that 28 federal law 
enforcement officers had been injured during protests. The most serious injury involved 
"a protester wielding a two-pound sledgehammer” who “struck an officer in the head and 
shoulder when the officer tried to prevent the protester from breaking down a door to the 
Hatfield Courthouse.”388  
 Property damage is more difficult to calculate. After the Portland police 
announced that $23 million in damages was sustained by Portland businesses during six 
weeks of protests, independent fact-checkers cast doubt on that statistic. Further analysis 
showed that one respondent had reported 90% of the total damages. The only business 
downtown that could feasibly earn that level of daily revenue was Pioneer Place mall, 
which was still closed for the majority of the protests because of Covid-19 restrictions. 
Nonetheless, it remains true the downtown businesses sustained losses from graffiti, 
broken windows, and other damage during the protests.389  
 Law enforcement responded to the Portland protests in turn. While the police 
violence that manifested in protests across the country also manifested in Portland, there 
were also new means of preventing protest. The most egregious may have been the 
conditional releases some arrested protestors were forced to sign.390  
Federal authorities used minor reasons to arrest protesters, like failure to 
immediately comply with orders to step off a sidewalk. Then, they included conditions in 
the arrest releases that barred the defendants from attending all other “protests, rallies, 
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assemblies, or public gatherings” in Portland or Oregon.391 Protesters were faced with the 
choice between remaining in a holding cell indefinitely or giving up their freedom of 
assembly. On one release, Magistrate Judge Acosta wrote in a restriction on attending 
protests by hand, which one constitutional scholar described as “sort of hilariously 
unconstitutional.”392 
 The Lafayette Square and Portland protests offer a modern perspective on the 
themes that I have traced through the history of assembly and association. The violence 
faced by protesters in the Black Lives Matter movement this summer was reminiscent in 
some ways of the harsh limitations on assembly in the Antebellum and Reconstruction 
South, and especially of the police brutality faced by protesters in the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s. Assembly has been a valuable tool in the fight for racial 
equality—it has protected the NAACP from its creation in the early 20th century and was 
used to convict white supremacists under the Enforcement Act in the Reconstruction 
South. Unfortunately, it has been repeatedly denied to people of color because of the 
importance assembly has in social and political life. After all, the Court gutted the first 
Enforcement Act in US v. Cruikshank. 
In Chapter III, I suggested that the Court’s ruling in Bryant v. Zimmerman was 
sufficiently distinct from NAACP because one involved the KKK, which partook in 
violent activities, and one involved the NAACP, which did not.393 394 The violence of 
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two. The protestors in Portland were both violent and nonviolent, often in the same 
crowd. Distinguishing between the two can be very challenging for officers in the 
moment 
There are differences between the past cases and the Portland protests. Bryant and 
NAACP both focus on associations, while the protests in Portland were much more 
similar to assemblies by definition—the protests were made up of a variety of changing 
groups and individuals.395 As a result, demanding membership lists is not a feasible 
option. In executing arrests for unlawful assembly, it seems that officers will either have 
to choose to over or under correct. Asking officers to air on the side of caution ensures 
the broadest protection constitutionally. However, when officers begin to sustain serious 
injuries, there needs to be some mechanism is in place to limit the violence.  
The Portland riots emphasize how group rights can be dangerous in a way that 
individual rights, like speech, are not. One speaker cannot begin to cause the physical 
damage that one assembly can in the same timeframe. Groups can also spin out of control 
and become significantly harder to contain than one speaker ever would be. Assembly 
rights must be broad and unregulated to be meaningful, but some limitations might be 
necessary to prevent serious violence. This tension will be made starkly clear when I 
discuss the Capitol insurrection later in this chapter. While that example involves 
associational freedoms, the Portland protests are predominantly assembly-based.  
 Finally, it is worth considering how the Black Lives Matter movement bears some 
similarities to the communist organizations of the 1960s. This summer, the Black Lives 
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Matter called for a radical restructuring of the United States. Specifically, they sought to 
deconstruct the systemic racism that has permeated almost every avenue of American 
life. 396 In the 1960s, affiliates with communist organizations were repeatedly denied their 
freedom of assembly because communist ideology was considered too radical in its 
opposition to the US government.397 Communists were opposed to the US economic 
system. The Black Lives Matter protesters were particularly focused on reforming 
policing and the justice system.  
 The Court used the fact that “the tenets of the Communist Party include the 
ultimate overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence” to 
justify limiting freedom of expression. In retrospect, these judgments seem overly 
cautious. In 1969, the Court overturned the ruling in Whitney with the case Brandenburg 
v. Ohio. The Court held that “[f]reedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to 
forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action,” and struck down the conviction of a KKK member under a 
syndicalism law. This standard is significantly more lenient because it requires there to be 
a strong likelihood of incitement of lawless action. In contrast, Whitney was indicted for 
being associated with a group that partially advocated for violence. 
 This shift in jurisprudence is important to protecting the Black Lives Matter 
movement. It means that different associations in the movement cannot be criminalized 
for advocating for revolution, so long as they do not incite imminent violence. The 
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violence that has existed in the Black Lives Matter movement also takes a different form. 
Rather than being part of the ideology, it is a rare occurrence that has happened at a small 
number of riotous gatherings.398  
 
DeRay McKesson v. John Doe 
 On November 2nd, 2020 the Supreme Court handed down a decision directly 
related to freedom of assembly, permit requirements, and Black Lives Matter. During 
protests against the shooting of a black man named Alton Sterling in July 2016, a Baton 
Rouge officer sustained injuries after being hit with a “rock like” object. The officer, 
referred to as Officer Doe in the case, sued the organizer, DeRay McKesson. McKesson 
was not accused of throwing the object or of encouraging the throwing of the object. 
Rather, the lawsuit alleged that McKesson “negligently staged the protest in a manner 
that caused the assault.”399 
 The district court held in favor of McKesson on First Amendment grounds. The 
Fifth Circuit court reversed, arguing that it was “patently foreseeable” that by leading the 
protest onto public streets, the Baton Rouge police would begin arrests which would 
create a “foreseeable risk of violence.” Thus, McKesson had violated his “duty not to 
negligently precipitate the crime 
of a third party.”400 
 
398 Black Lives Matter, “About.” 
399 DeRay McKesson v. John Doe, 592 U.S. 1. 
400 DeRay McKesson v. John Doe, 592 U.S. 2-3. 
 131 
 The Court used a technicality to avoid making any meaningful ruling on the 
grounds of First Amendment freedoms. In the decision, they hold that “the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation of state law is too uncertain a premise on which to address the question 
presented.”401 The Court directs the Fifth Circuit back to the Louisiana Supreme Court to 
clarify the state law at hand because there is no current precedent on the meaning of the 
liability standard. They acknowledge that this is an unusual directive but suggest that it is 
appropriate given the peculiarity of state laws on this subject and the interest in avoiding 
premature adjudication.402  
 This case illustrates how permit requirements can discourage the exercise of 
assembly rights. By making organizers responsible for the behavior of those who attend 
their marches, the Fifth Circuit places an incredible burden on those seeking to assemble. 
Because spontaneous marches are largely impossible in the modern regulatory system, a 
protest organizer would have to decide whether they are willing to take on the liability for 
the actions of anyone who might attend. 
The Fifth Circuit ruling also displays a different kind of guilt-by-association than 
that was present in communist cases like Whitney. In that case, Whitney was convicted 
for her participation in the convention that established the Communist Labor Party in 
California. Even though she showed no “specific intent on her part to join in the 
forbidden purpose of the association,” her continued presence at the convention, 
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membership to the Communist party, and failure to object to discussions of violence and 
terrorism all were sufficient to convict her.403 
In both cases, Whitney and McKesson are punished for the actions of those they 
affiliate with, but not for anything they did themselves. Whitney faced a criminal charge, 
while McKesson’s was civil. Whitney was participating in the meeting of an association, 
while McKesson was leading an assembly. But both suffered because according to courts, 
they should have foreseen the actions of others.404 
This approach seems flawed. If assembly rights protect the right individuals to 
meet, it seems erroneous to then punish someone for who they have chosen to meet with. 
Instead, punishment for illegal actions in assemblies should be dealt with on an individual 
basis as much as possible. The foreseeable actions in both cases are not convincing 
enough to justify this erosion of assembly rights. 
The choice of the Supreme Court to dodge a decision that would involve a serious 
exploration of First Amendment rights is similar to the protest cases from the Civil Rights 
movement. In those cases, the Court chose to strike down the convictions of protesters on 
mostly technical grounds.405 Similarly, the Court prevented the conviction of McKesson 
by the Fifth Circuit by using a rare move and deferring to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 
However, they did not absolve McKesson of the charges.  
The Court did not take the opportunity in the 1960s to reinvigorate the right to 
peaceably assembly. In the absence of such a decision, assembly continued to decline in 
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importance until it disappeared entirely in 1983. Now, the Court is presented with a 
unique opportunity to introduce freedom of assembly back into their doctrine as they 
confront the cases generated out of the new Civil Rights Movement. 
 
January 6th Insurrection 
 Part of what drove the uproar around the police brutality encountered by Black 
Lives Matter protesters was how sharply it was juxtaposed with the assemblies, made 
predominantly up of white people, that had protested Covid-19 restrictions earlier in the 
year. Those groups carried guns, violated stay-at-home orders, and called for armed 
insurrection against state governments. Still, nonviolent protesters for racial equality 
experienced more mass arrests and brutality from law enforcement than the white 
insurrectionists.406 
 This dynamic is the result of systemic racism that has always existed in the United 
States. While white Americans were able to gather in spontaneous and rowdy groups 
across the United States in the 19th century, Black citizens in the South were being denied 
the right to attend church, school, and more.407 
 The events of January 6th, 2021 underline this contradiction. On the day that 
Congress was set to verify the results of the 2020 presidential election, President Trump 
held a rally near the White House. He called for members of Congress to reject the results 
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of the election as fraudulent and encouraged his supporters to “walk down to the 
Capitol.”408 And walk to the Capitol they did. 
 Angry, armed, and violent, protesters swarmed the building and began engaging 
the small force of Capitol Police officers protecting it. They broke windows and doors to 
get inside—the first time an insurrectionist force had entered the Capitol since the British 
in 1812. Many carrying guns and other weapons came within moments of 
Congresspeople who they had threatened violence against earlier. The fact that no 
member of Congress died that day had much more to do with luck and quick thinking 
than anything else.409 
 The attack was not without warning. Conversations about targeting the Capitol 
and planning logistics were all over far-media social media in the days leading up to it. 
These posts included photos and descriptions of guns that attendees planned on bring. 
While some action was taken by the F.B.I. and Homeland security officials to prepare, 
the majority of law enforcement received no warning.410 
 First and foremost, the siege on the Capitol is a disquieting example of how 
dangerous assemblies can become. As the rally spun out of control, hundreds flooded into 
the Capitol—the symbolic and literal center of government of the United States—with 
the intent of stopping the process of governance. Once it started, it became very hard to 
stop. The building was only secured after National Guard arrived four hours after the 
Capitol Police called for backup.411 
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 The premeditation on social media tells a similar story about the dangers of 
association. Tocqueville warned that associations in countries with diametrically opposed 
parties are especially dangerous because such assemblies will be more inclined to resort 
to violence and attack the opposition.412 The far-right organizations that believed the 
2020 election was stolen fit this description to a tee.413 As associations move online, it 
will become more pressing for the Court to establish a clear doctrine on how and when to 
protect such groups—and when threats of imminent danger take preference.  
 January 6th, 2021 was also the first time the Confederate Flag was ever flown in 
the US Capitol building. The Confederate troops came within six miles of the building 
during the Civil War but never made it inside. This symbol communicates a great deal 
about how race affects the treatment of protesters. In lack of preparation for the rally, a 
former American counterterrorism official reflected, "There was a failure among law 
enforcement to imagine that people who ‘look like me’ would do this.”414 
 The dichotomy in treatment between races when it comes to assembly is 
extremely concerning. The freedom peaceably to assembly in the United States does not 
truly exist if it is only applied to a portion of the population. In the interest of self-
government, all communities should be able to organize and participate safely in 
assemblies. When white rioters are allowed to gather and threaten violence against the 
government, but peaceful Black protesters are teargassed and regulated out of public 
 
412 Tocqueville and Reeve, Democracy in America. Volumes I & II. 
413 Haberman, “Trump Told Crowd ‘You Will Never Take Back Our Country With Weakness.’” 
414 Mazzetti et al., “Inside a Deadly Siege.” 
 136 
spaces, there is a serious imbalance in who can fully participate in governance. At the 
extreme, this becomes anti-democratic. 
 The aims of far-right groups who perpetuated theories about the 2020 stolen 
election also offer an interesting study on Ashutosh Bhagwat’s theory. Bhagwat suggests 
that only associations with broadly democratic primary goals should be protected. In 
other words, groups are valuable insofar as they contribute to democracy, whether that be 
by petitioning the government, informing the citizenry, or serving a value-forming 
function. For example, the Boy Scouts serve a value-forming function, even if they are 
not clearly political. This approach contrasts the Supreme Court by not placing 
expressive requirements on associations.415 
 The question is whether the organizations that perpetuate falsehoods about the 
2020 election would receive associational protection. The insurrection at the Capitol was 
a violent and criminal attack. But if the group had instead just assembled peacefully, 
would the organizations still be afforded constitutional protections? The goal of the 
organizers was antidemocratic, as they sought to overturn the results of free and fair 
elections. However, most of the people who participated genuinely believed that the 
election was being stolen—that they were fighting back fascism rather than instigating 
it.416 As they saw it, they were petitioning the government and informing the citizenry.  
 Bhagwat warns against the perils of granting “government officials (including 
judges) the power to determine the ‘true’ values of democratic association.”417 He also 
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acknowledges that prioritizing group autonomy may result in “exclusion and vision” in 
society but that it’s a worthwhile cost.418 These statements suggest that he would be 
willing to accept more extreme and dissident groups to air on the side of caution. 
However, because his approach is content-based, it can be fallible. 
There are three ways Bhagwat’s theory could apply to this scenario. If “broadly 
democratic” includes political groups that are anti-democratic but exercising their voice, 
then the far-right groups in question would still receive protection under Bhagwat’s 
theory. If instead “broadly democratic” include groups who believe their primary goal is 
democratic, even when there is a good deal of evidence that it is not, then the group may 
or may not receive protections, depending on where an official chooses to draw the line. 
A court may deny that a clearly anti-democratic primary goal, like overturning a free and 
fair election, cannot be protected no matter how much a group believes in it. The goal is 
too opposed to free self-governance by all American people. 
 John Inazu might have a different perspective under his theory of group 
autonomy. While he would not want to endorse the siege on the Capitol, his theory 
continually emphasizes the importance of dissident groups in democracies. He criticizes 
pluralism and Rawlsian liberalism for how they limit assemblies to create general 
consensus. The alt-right organizations represented at the Capitol insurrection certainly 
fall outside the bounds of popular consensus in the US. In this way, they would be 
protected as assemblies that embody a dissident perspective that is worthy of 
constitutional protection, no matter its purpose.419  
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For Inazu, the issue is much simpler because he does not involve the content of an 
assembly in his theoretical standard. Instead, he is mainly concerned with conduct. While 
the violent conduct of the mob at the Capitol would not be protected under his approach, 
associations that perpetuated myths about a stolen election would be. In this way, Inazu's 
approach is beneficial because of the clarity it offers; by focusing primarily on conduct, it 
is easier to avoid the loss of group autonomy through unfair rulings. 
 
Anti-Protest Laws 
 In response to the Black Lives Matter movement, Republican lawmakers across 
the country have begun introducing anti-protest legislation. The International Center for 
Not-for-Profit Law reported that twice as many bills limiting assembly rights have been 
introduced across the country in 2021 as compared to any other year. In total, 81 
proposals have been made in 34 states.420 
 The proposals take different forms. In Indiana, people convicted of unlawful 
assembly would be banned from working for the state government, including in elected 
positions. In Minnesota, those same people would be denied access to “student loans, 
unemployment benefits, or housing assistance.”421 In the most extreme proposals, drivers 
in Oklahoma and Iowa who hit protesters with their vehicles in public streets would be 
granted immunity.422  
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 In Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis signed what he called “the strongest anti-
looting, anti-rioting, pro-law-enforcement piece of legislation in the country” into law.423 
The legislation expands the definition of a riot to include gatherings of just three people. 
It then places extreme consequences on anyone arrested for rioting. Furthermore, it 
absolves liability for “personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage,” if someone 
injures or kills a person guilty of so-called “rioting.”424 
 These bills represent an extreme form of assembly regulation that Tabatha Abu 
El-Haj and Nicholas S. Brod are concerned about.425 Rather than placing limits on the 
assembly itself, these proposals dissuade citizens from wanting to engage in assembly at 
all. In the same way that McKesson has been sued for the violent actions of another 
person at a protest, laws like the one passed in Florida could convict whole groups of 
people for the actions of a riotous few. 
 Laws that leaving gatherings unprotected in public streets from drivers are 
another serious limitation. Public streets are a salient place to gather. This can be seen 
throughout the history of assembly. William Penn sermonized in the streets of England 
after being denied a place of worship, an event later referenced by the First Congress. In 
the Founding era, spontaneous marches traced their way through streets, gathering 
supporters as they went. After Bloody Sunday during the Civil Rights Movement, 
protesters made the long walk on the highway from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama. 
Public streets have been a special way of gaining the attention of the nation at large. 
 
423 Epstein and Mazzei. 
424 Goodman and Moynihan, “Anti Protest Laws Grant Drivers License to Kill.” 
425 Abu El-Haj, “The Neglected Right of Assembly.”; Brod, “Rethinking a Reinvigorated Right to 
Assembly.” 
 140 
 Brod emphasizes the importance of time and place in the message of assemblies. 
Legislation that leaves protesters unprotected against motorists is a clear restraint on 
assembly, even if it does not come in the form of a time, place, or manner restriction. 
Instead, it fosters violence against citizens who are trying to exercise their fundamental 
right to self-governance. Laws like that in Florida would be unlikely to hold up under the 
means-end scrutiny that Brod advocates for, as using public streets is often a crucial 
means to the end goal of an assembly.426 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I reviewed four events from the last year that offer key 
perspectives on assembly in 2021. First, the Black Lives Matter movement in the summer 
of 2020 demonstrated how important assemblies still are in the political lives of 
Americans. When it came to expressing deep dissatisfaction over systemic racism in the 
US, protest was the main tool utilized. Unfortunately, many of these protests were met 
with disproportionate violence from law enforcement. I describe the Lafayette Square 
protests as emblematic of this and apply Tabatha Abu El-Haj’s argument against permit 
requirements to the police violence and curfew requirements.  
 I used the protests in Portland to investigate assemblies which resulted in property 
damage and rioting. I compare this violence to that in Bryant v. Zimmerman and consider 
whether the line drawn between Bryant and NAACP v. Alabama holds up. I also point out 
that the violence against journalists throughout the protests shows the usefulness of 
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Ashutosh Bhagwat’s theory of self-governance. Each First Amendment freedom is 
crucial towards real democratic government. 
 In my next section, I discussed the November 2020 decision by the Supreme 
Court, DeRay McKesson v. John Doe. The case offered the Court an opportunity to 
reinvigorate the right to assembly. Instead, it used a technicality to pass the decision back 
to the Fifth Circuit court. I point out that the Court similarly dodged opportunities to 
expand assembly when deciding Civil Rights cases in the 1960s. I also argue that the 
Fifth Circuit ruling has troubling similarities to Whitney v. California in its approach to 
guilt by association. 
 In the section, I changed focus from the Black Lives Matter movement to the 
January 6th insurrection on the Capitol. I point out that this attack epitomizes the danger 
that white privilege poses to the democratic exercise of freedom to assemble. I also use 
the theories of Tocqueville, Bhagwat, and John Inazu to consider what freedoms should 
be afforded to extremist dissident groups, if any. 
 Finally, I explored the wave of anti-protest legislation introduced by G.O.P. 
politicians across the country. I argue that these bills are extremely damaging to freedom 
of assembly. Rather than being typical regulations like curfews, they limit assembly 
expanding the definition of unlawful assembly, raising the stakes of potential arrest, and 
putting the lives of protesters in danger. I use Brod’s theory to point out how endangering 
protesters using public streets is antithetical to the nature of assembly and contradictory 
to how it was conceived of and used throughout our nation's history. 
 The siege of the Capitol and the violence in Portland offer two competing 
perspectives on violent assemblies. I believe they also give insight into what an effective 
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standard for violent assembly might. The Portland protests illustrate the danger of over-
policing assemblies. When federal troops arrived, the violence escalated. This is why 
placing minimal regulations on assembly is important.  
On the other hand, the siege on the Capitol should have been met with greater law 
enforcement. This is not a failure of free assembly, but rather part of an endemic problem 
in law enforcement—white supremacy. When there is the intelligence to indicate an 
attempt to attack the Capitol, increased security is extremely justified. Groups advocating 
for this type of unlawful activities are not entitled to the same association rights as groups 
that are largely peaceful like those in the Black Lives Matter. 
In sum: assemblies should be allowed to gather free of police brutality, even given 
the risk of violence, unless there is substantial evidence demonstrating a risk of an 
imminent attack. The potential for property damage as a result of less regulated 
assemblies is a cost that must be taken on to preserve the fundamental contributions that 
assemblies make towards self-governance. The emphasis on eliminating preemptive 
limits on assembly in Inazu's theory and on the importance of democratic associations in 
Bhagwat's theory both contribute to this approach. 
 Taken in combination, these four events drive home the importance of 
unencumbered freedom of assembly in the United States. Even after being ignored by the 
Supreme Court for over thirty years, assembly remains a rich part of American life. 
Protest is a key way in which citizens gathering to express dissatisfaction, spread ideas, 
and influence their leaders.  
But assembly is also under attack. Between excessive police brutality, an evasive 
Supreme Court decision, and anti-protest legislation, assembly is less protected than ever 
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in the United States. To ensure that the right remains focal in American life—and that 
protesters are not risking their lives by walking on the street—the Court must separate 
assembly from speech. In doing so, they will have the leeway to expand protections 
beyond clearly expressive organizations. This will ensure that citizens can still exercise a 








What this thesis has attempted to do is illustrate the importance freedom of 
assembly has had in the history of the United States as it contributes to democratic 
governance. Assemblies and associations help people build personal identities, 
communities, and values. It allows them to exchange ideas, air grievances, and organize 
protests. It is a tool for grabbing the attention of the public, exerting power on politicians, 
and checking the majority. These are vital tasks to self-government. As it has been eroded 
through time because of municipal regulations and expressive requirements, something 
important has been a loss. Given the events of the last year, I argue that it is overdue for 
the Supreme Court to reinvigorate the right once more. 
In Chapter II, I trace the history of assembly in the United States. In the Founding 
era, assembly was freely used to participate in civic culture. First, permit requirements 
were unheard of. Instead, spontaneous gatherings to celebrate holidays and participate in 
festive politics were common. Second, the qualifier "peaceably" did very little to 
constrain the right—disruptive and loud assemblies were acceptable so long as they did 
not become too rowdy. Third, assembly was seen as protecting associations as well. 
Groups like the Democratic-Republican societies invoked freedom of assembly to justify 
protect themselves. 
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This remained true about assembly through the majority of the 19th century. Then, 
at the close of the 1800s, US v. Cruikshank and Davis v. Massachusetts significantly 
restricted the right of assembly in ways it would never quite recover from. Limits on 
public forum use, permit requirements, and enforcement of assembly protections all 
remain part of Court jurisprudence today as a result. 
Despite these limitations, assembly has remained crucial to social movements in 
the United States. Especially to disenfranchised citizens, assembly offers a powerful tool 
for organizing and exercising political power. This was illustrated most clearly through 
the Suffragettes and the 1960s Civil Rights Movement. The opposite is also true: 
reducing the ability of groups to meet has deep consequences for their social, cultural, 
and political lives. This was illustrated by the treatment of Black Americans in the 
Antebellum South. 
Assembly began to fade from court jurisprudence after the introduction of 
association as an independent right in 1958. But it was not eliminated entirely until the 
Court defined it as “communicative activity,” making it secondary to speech, in Perry 
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association.  
Freedom of association became an official nontextual right in 1958, in the 
landmark case NAACP v. Alabama. In Chapter III, I trace associations trajectory from 
being interchangeable with assembly for the first 150 years to it eventually being 
subsumed into free speech. I also consider Tocqueville’s argument in favor of US 
associations because of our democratic system. 
Freedom of association protected the NAACP during the Civil Rights Movement, 
ensuring that the association had the privacy it needed to continue operating effectively. 
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In contrast, communist organizations were frequently denied those same protections, 
often for tenuous reasons.  
At this time, freedom of association was being equated with an expressive 
purpose. The Court would protect the NAACP because they were a place to exchange 
ideas and they sent a political message. At the start of the 1980s, Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees set out a new standard that would connect association almost entirely to its 
expressive content and begin a new doctrine surrounding anti-discrimination cases.  
The Roberts test has its weaknesses, as highlighted in the case Dale v. Boy Scouts 
of the United States. More importantly, it limited association to its expressive content or 
intimacy. Any non-intimate association must have a clear doctrine or expressive purpose 
to receive constitutional protections, a dramatic change from how association was treated 
in the past. 
In Chapter IV, I review four different theories, three of which focus on assembly 
and one of which focuses on association. While each of these theories makes valuable, 
original contributions, they are also useful for what they share in common. Each argues 
that expressive constraints on assembly and/or association are too limiting, that the 
history of assembly can be used to ground how we approach these rights in the modern-
day, and—most importantly—assembly and associations are fundamentally important 
towards the purpose of self-governance. These group rights contribute to a democratic 
government in ways that cannot be captured by individual rights like speech. To attempt 
to do so is to misunderstand their purpose. 
The reason this all matters now is grounded in Chapter V. I review the events of 
the past year, focusing on four in particular: the Black Lives Matter movement, the 
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Court’s decision in DeRay McKesson v. John Doe, the January 6th siege on the Capitol, 
and the wave of anti-protest bills sweeping the country. Each of these events, in 
combination with the theories from Chapter IV, offers insight into the problems with how 
assembly operates in the modern-day. The asymmetrical treatment of race, the intense 
regulations, and the development of guilt-by-association penalties are all seriously 
concerning. The potential for violence by assemblies also must be reckoned. I argue that 
the appropriate way to handle this conflict is to allow assemblies to gather freely as much 
as possible until there is substantial evidence for unlawful intent. 
The Court must reincorporate freedom of assembly and association back into their 
jurisprudence, independent of expressive requirements. These rights are part of an 
essential collection of freedoms that promote democratic governance in the United States. 
Assemblies allow citizens to gather, celebrate, and learn, in both spontaneous and 
permanent ways. This dynamic is a fundamental part of understanding political 
organizing throughout the history of the United States. Ultimately, the ability of people to 
assembly without restrictions is why the Founders were able to write the US Constitution. 
And it is part of how American citizens can amend that Constitution--by calling together 
conventions.427 The power of those gatherings transcends any expressive purpose that 
might be applied to them.  
The current restrictions suffocate this culture of assembly and threaten American 
self-governance. To ensure that the United States remains a government by the people, 
for the people, the Court must reinvigorate assembly and association.  
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